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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
DEAN DILLER: Hello everyone. My name is Matthew Diller, the 
dean of Fordham Law School. Thank you so much for joining us today. 
Today, we have the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial 
Law’s annual symposium. This year’s topic is who makes ESG and 
understanding the stakeholders in the ESG debate. 
At the outset, I want to thank Professors Caroline Gentile and  
Sean Griffith for their immense contributions as faculty advisors to the 
Journal. I want to thank all of our incredibly distinguished panelists and 
speakers today. I will give a particular shoutout to Fordham alum Scott 
Simpson, from the class of ‘82, as well as to former Chief Justice Leo 
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court. I also want to thank our students, 
especially the members of the Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, 
and in particular Dianna Lam, the symposium editor and the architect of 
this event, who will be serving as moderator. 
The Journal of Corporate & Financial Law was established in 
1995 and is one of the premier student-edited business law journals in 
the country. It is the second-most cited specialty journal in banking and 
finance and among the top ten specialty journals in corporations and 
associations. Its articles, notes, essays, comments, and symposia are 
heavily relied on by academics, practitioners, executives, regulators, and 
judges to keep abreast of leading corporate law scholarship and 
emerging issues in banking, bankruptcy, corporate governance, capital 
markets, finance, mergers and acquisitions, securities, and tax law and 
practice. 
Today’s program is on a fascinating and important subject, and I’ll 
talk about that in a moment. But first, let me just say that the Journal is 
really a centerpiece of Fordham Law School’s involvement and 
engagement with business law. It has been a tremendous vehicle by 
which our students interact with scholars and practitioners, and both 
contribute to the scholarly debate and also help to focus it through 
publishing and editing. Fordham Law School has long placed a priority 
on tackling difficult issues in business law. I think we are one of the few 
major law schools that I know of where corporate law is a required 
course. I know this makes me sound really old, but when I started on the 
faculty, it wasn’t just a required course—it was a full-year required 
course. 
We have about 100 business law courses in the curriculum, and we 
draw on both a superb faculty in the field as well as an adjunct faculty 
drawn from many leading practitioners in the city and beyond. And so 
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today’s program is something I’m very proud of and the school is very 
proud of. 
The topic is of critical importance. In recent years, the role of the 
stakeholder in modern capitalism has been at the forefront of corporate 
discussion. How should corporations balance the interest of stakeholders 
and shareholders, particularly as they diverge? The pandemic and the 
social issues which have been brought into focus this year have 
strengthened the importance of this larger conversation, and today’s 
program aims to foster a meaningful dialogue concerning the history, 
present state, and future of environmental, social, and economic 
governance criteria as a measure of corporate performance. 
Our panels and speakers will address whether a corporation will 
recalibrate how they deliver upon these ESG goals, or if the burden will 
continue to fall on stakeholders to effectuate their desired changes. As 
the pandemic and the social issues recently brought into focus have 
galvanized a movement towards ESG, will that energy last, or will 
businesses return to their previous state once we return to normalcy? 
And what lessons can our country draw from the European Union? 
Thank you for joining us today. I want to thank all of our speakers 
and participants, and I want to introduce Dianna Lam, the symposium 






AJ HARRIS: Thank you for joining us today. To start this 
discussion, perhaps we could take a brief overview of directors and their 
duties, both in the U.S. and in Europe, to start. Are there any concerns 
regarding liability for directors if they are not exclusively working to 
promote shareholder value? 
MR. CORTE: Let me give, perhaps, a European overview of 
fiduciary duties as they relate to ESG to start the discussion; then David, 
you can pick up on the U.S. bit. I think as a general matter, there is not 
one standard that applies across Europe. The EU has not codified 
fiduciary duties for directors; however, generally speaking, across 
countries, the focus in terms of fiduciary duties of directors of European 
companies is on what you refer to in Europe as the corporate interest. 
What is meant by that is the interest of the company as a whole and all 
of its stakeholders, so that is shareholders, of course, but that is also 
employees, and to a certain degree, creditors and other stakeholders, 
depending on the circumstances of the company. The general principle 
applies across Europe. How that is interpreted in each jurisdiction 
differs quite dramatically and depends a little bit on the legislation of 
each jurisdiction. 
In Europe, you go from jurisdictions where employees are required 
to have a seat on the board—in certain cases, at least three seats on the 
board—and therefore, have meaningful participation through their 
representatives in the actual corporate governance of the company itself. 
There are also situations where employees have a specific say in specific 
transactions, for example, merger transactions in Europe have 
consultation rights that employee representatives may exercise.1 If you 
are moving jurisdictions of a company from one jurisdiction or another, 
or significantly altering the business of the company, there are 
requirements to consult with employees in several jurisdictions, notably 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and certain Nordic jurisdictions 
 
† Panel 1 was moderated by symposium editor Dianna Lam and symposium committee 
members AJ Harris and Taylor Wells. 
 1. See Council Directive 2002/14/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29–34 (EC). 
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which bring their employees into the governance of the company quite 
significantly. 
Though you have that extreme or that reality on the one end of the 
spectrum, you also have jurisdictions like, I would say, the UK, where 
the approach to fiduciary duties, even though they are termed as the 
interest of the company and all of its stakeholders, has traditionally 
looked principally at shareholder value. The reason for that is that 
employees do not really have participation in the governance of the 
company and ultimately the directors are elected by shareholders and so 
naturally they will tend to look at what the shareholder interests are. But 
by and large, I think that there is a broader view of what the fiduciary 
duties of directors are across Europe. 
There is a shift these days to refocusing on the actual language that 
describes these fiduciary duties and focusing on other aspects of the 
company—on the input of employees and other stakeholders—and so, I 
would say that given that starting point, there is far less concern with the 
topic of liability of directors for not exclusively promoting shareholder 
value. It would probably be the other way around, you would have to 
add even in the jurisdictions that are closest to say, Delaware, you would 
have to at least evaluate what the effect of decisions that you take at the 
board level are on employees or other stakeholders of the company. So, 
I do not think the issue is as significant in Europe as it might be in the 
States, David. 
MR. SILK: This is an issue that in the States, as of late, has 
generated a lot of debate. Although the debate has in some respects 
generated more heat than light. 
Let me start with a little bit of background that is helpful because it 
ties to the shift that Lorenzo was talking about. If you start way back in 
the history of time, corporations had to have some kind of a public 
benefit, that public benefit ran to the crown or whoever the government 
was. But there had to be some public benefit element to get the 
corporate charter. This faded over time, over hundreds of years until the 
point in the middle of the last century, where at least in the U.S., it had 
faded completely. The dominant view of corporate law was that the 
purpose of the corporation was solely to benefit the financial interests of 
shareholders. 
As pendulums do, that pendulum has swung back over the last 
several decades to the point where the Business Roundtable recognized, 
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about a year ago, that corporations are really part of a larger ecosystem.2 
Part of the purpose of a corporation includes making positive 
contributions to society. That background and the revised view of 
purpose is important because it recognizes evolving expectations. 
Expectations have changed, however, the law really has not changed. It 
is critical to understand this divergence because the real-life decisions of 
directors, whether here in the U.S. or elsewhere, are very much 
impacted by expectations—decisions rarely flirt with the bounds of the 
law. Decisions that we read about in cases are those that flirted with the 
bounds of the law; those that flirt with the bounds of expectations are 
dealt with by shareholder votes, and people buying and selling stock. 
That is important background to what the law actually is. 
Here in the United States, whether in Delaware or elsewhere, there 
is in fact wide deference to the board of directors. In the limited context 
of a sale or breakup of the corporation, it is clear, at least in Delaware, 
that in that context the directors’ duty is to maximize the short-term 
value of the Corporation for the stockholders.3 In the general operational 
context, courts defer to the business judgment of disinterested directors 
and do not actually require maximization of short-term stockholder 
value in these ordinary course business decisions where ESG would 
come into effect. Now, the limit to all that is waste: Directors are not 
allowed to engage in waste.4 That being said, a board that is engaging in 
an ESG-type decision is likely to consider that decision in the context of 
the best interest of the company. 
There is a lot of debate over this question of “must you attend 
solely to the financial benefit of stockholders, or can you consider these 
other things?” I think you can consider these other things, and indeed, 
that is not a change in the law at all. It is important that you do consider 
these other things, and I believe that the expectations have changed. 
There is a greater expectation now within the United States that people 
will actually pay attention to ESG type risks and opportunities in the 
way that they make their decisions. 
 
 2. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote “‘An 




 3. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173 (Del. 1986). 
 4. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). 
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In terms of actual liability, directors of Delaware companies, at 
least, have had more exposure—again in the ordinary course of 
operations, rather than the terminal value situation—they have had more 
exposure for failing to comply with or think about ESG considerations. 
For example, the recent Bluebell case,5 where a board did not 
appropriately consider the health and safety aspects of its operations and 
was held to be violating its fiduciary duties. A well advised board in the 
United States will think about the value aspects of the ESG 
opportunities and will generally make decisions that it considers to be in 
the best interests of the corporation. A component of that is going to be 
the long term value of the corporation. 
This is where the heat versus light comes in. You do not see a 
board sitting around saying, “I am going to make this decision even 
though it is going to destroy value for the corporation.” That record just 
does not exist. You see directors sitting around saying, “Is this the right 
thing to do and what is the benefit in making the decision?” 
Bottom line is, I do not think that a well-advised board is going to 
have to stay up at night worrying that they are going to have financial 
exposure or liability as a result of making ESG type decisions that are 
part of their ordinary-course business decisions. 
MR. SIMPSON: David, if I may ask a question regarding what you 
and Lorenzo said: For those of us who have been practicing in Europe 
for the last 20 or 30 years, I think we would suggest that in the context 
of ESG, there is a distinct advantage to a board in Europe based on the 
historical reference point for European Directors, stemming from the 
definition around an affirmative obligation to consider the interest of all 
stakeholders and not just shareholders. Number one, I think that is an 
important distinction, and perhaps gives European companies a little bit 
of a head start. I accept, as you say, that for all sorts of good reasons, 
including big investors in the U.S. pushing boards to consider any 
variety of other interests in addition to short term interest—I get that. Do 
you think that directors would benefit in the US, from a broader 
definition of the corporate interest? Is it really an advantage that the 
European companies have, by reference, to their home jurisdictions or 
not? 
MR. SILK: I think that the advantage is in the fact that these 
decisions, these types of interests, are regularly brought before European 
directors in a way that they might not have been regularly brought 
 
 5. Wenske v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc., 2018 WL 3337531 (Del. Ch. July 6, 
2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 5994971 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2018). 
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before U.S. directors. There are states, however, that have constituency 
statutes where these types of interests are specifically permitted, 
although rarely required, to be considered.6 And whether or not there is 
a constituency statute, I think that at the end of the day, directors think 
about ESG decisions in terms of what is in the best interests of the 
corporation itself, including in the context of long-term value. I think 
that most ESG decisions are evaluated in the context of what value the 
decision brings to the corporation. So, to get to your question, I think 
that there is an advantage for European companies in that there may be 
an educational head start that is historical. 
MR. CORTE: How about the idea of employee participation on the 
board? That is not implemented throughout Europe in a uniform manner 
at all. In fact, I would still say it is probably the exception, if I think 
about it. There are maybe four or five prominent jurisdictions that 
prominently enforce that and some other jurisdictions, that on the wave 
of ESG, are now considering whether to implement that type of 
legislation and consider it from time to time. One of those is the UK 
actually, where this is brought up every once in a while. Do you think 
that would meaningfully influence the ability to consider ESG issues by 
a board? I will tell you my perception is that in a lot of European boards 
where I have seen employee representative participation, the employee 
representatives were not as vocal as I would have expected them to be. 
MS. BETTS: Yes, I am surprised. We were talking about ESG as a 
big sort of lump thing. We have been talking a lot about social and 
obviously employee’s representations, looking after your employees, 
which is something that obviously has come to the fore and in the 
context of COVID. If we step back a little bit from COVID and look at 
ESG as what it is—Environment, Social, and Governance—I think the 
United States is not as far back from Europe as everybody might think. 
If you look at governance, per se, and you look at the exchange 
requirements in particular, I think you have already got a really good set 
of rules and ensuring that the sort of basic governance principles are 
covered. You will have things, say on pay, you will have things like 
board representation for minorities or an effort on gender fluidity, etc. 
You do have a lot of good foundational blocks, if you want, in terms of 
the “G.” 
 
 6. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Purpose, 62 B.C. L. REV. 851, 865–67 (2021). 
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In terms of the “E,” there are going to be a lot of ways for the “E” 
to start. Things will come to the corporation where they will not be able 
to avoid it and they will have to make decisions. The boards will have to 
make decisions that take into consideration, whether it is “E,” “S,” or 
“G,” but generally on the “E” side, which will be linked to that 
economic interest in the short, medium, and long term. In particular, if 
you are going to go and try to fund a project that is deemed to be at risk 
from some of the insurance—suddenly, the cost of funding those 
projects is going to be higher. The valuation assigned to this project by 
the stock market is going to be lower. The cost of insuring them is going 
to be higher. Suddenly, you have got a cluster of incentives that are 
pushing the Corporation and the board of directors to take a slightly 
different approach to those, and I think in that sense, we will have a 
different shape of approach to “E,” “S,” and “G.” 
As to capitalism, we are all working really hard behind the scenes, 
trying to bring that regulation together globally on ESG, but I think the 
“E” will come through different routes to different companies. I think 
the “S” is obviously very specific, very topical right now and I think the 
governance is often regulated by local jurisdiction, in particular 
exchange regulations, which makes for a very interesting sort of 
patchwork if you want. 
We need to look at all of these interests for one particular company 
in one particular region. The challenge of ESG is that we are trying to 
approach it as one big thing, one big silver bullet. But in fact, it has got 
many facets and many ways to implement it from a board perspective. 
Hopefully, directors will not feel that it is a big threat to them, but, on 
the contrary, that it is full of opportunities for them trying to enhance 
shareholder value. 
MR. SIMPSON: Stephanie, I fully agree that it is a multi-headed 
sort of issue. The one common feature about ESG is that it is different 
maybe than short-term shareholder value. Before you say anything else, 
I should probably highlight something on behalf of all of us, which is 
that these are our own personal views, and not views of our firms or any 
of our clients. So, we “take that as read,” because I am perhaps going to 
say things that some of Lorenzo and my partners would disagree with. I 
think the one common element to ESG in this debate is the fact that it is 
different than short-term shareholder value or arguably different. I think 
maybe a combination of the fact that European companies under most of 
the jurisdictions where they are incorporated are encouraged to look to a 
broader set of stakeholder interests which is a huge advantage to them. 
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I would make the other observation and I am sure Leo Strine may 
disagree later, but he gets the last statement at the end, so he can say 
what he wants. I think there is another big difference here that we 
haven’t touched on. In the United States, directors are regularly brought 
before a court to have their conduct challenged. That is just not the case 
in Europe. If you have a board in Europe that actually wants to make a 
bold move: One, they can point to a definition of their duty which is 
broader and allows for stakeholder interest. Two, chances are high they 
are not going to get brought in front of a court anytime soon. I think that 
is a very powerful tool that a European board who wants to push into 
ESG has that a board in the United States might not have because they 
might not be able to point to a statute that is broad enough. They 
certainly will have to deal with shareholder litigation, but I don’t know, 
David, if that is fair enough. 
MR. SILK: As a practical matter, if the board, by pushing into a 
broad new ESG development, were actually saying to itself, this is 
something that we want to do for the environment, but we see no benefit 
to the company, that would be hard for a board to do. But in approving a 
project, a board would more likely conclude that the project is actually 
good for the company because it recognizes the need for transitioning to 
a lower carbon environment and moving to the next level. 
Similarly, a board may recognize that social justice is important to 
the functioning of its business. For example, if the company is going to 
have its stores open and sell goods, there cannot be riots in the streets. 
For most ESG actions that boards want to take, there is very little real 
life risk that the liability framework in the United States is going to 
somehow interfere with it. If you get to this question of a board wanting 
to take a broad new step, maybe you just have a different viewpoint 
from a U.S. company to an EU company. However, I suspect that the 
board will be able to develop the kind of record that it needs, that the 
action that it wants to take is in the best interests of the corporation over 
the long term. 
You asked whether employee representation on U.S. boards would 
make a difference? I think it would, to the extent that, presumably, that 
kind of representation is union-based representation. The unions here 
have been very active in corporate governance, in bringing shareholder 
proposals and whatnot. I don’t think they would necessarily be 
wallflowers in a boardroom. I think that they probably would be active, 
and I think that would bring a different perspective from at least from 
the “S” part of ESG, or as Leo would say, the other “E” part of EESG. 
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MS. BETTS: It is an interesting point, David, because when we talk 
about diversity, and the diversity of boards, one of the things that is 
interesting is not to have everybody coming from the same place, 
whether it is NYU, Columbia, Harvard, or Fordham. You want people 
from different horizons because you look at the company and you think, 
well, I am operating in this environment. Who am I selling to? Who am 
I servicing? You need some form of representation of what the real 
world is within your board, so they have a better understanding of how 
to position the company going forward to benefit from all the 
opportunities that they are going to have. Regarding the ESG concept 
versus liability, I do take on board the point that the SEC is very long 
arm when it comes to punishing noncompliance, in the sort of executive. 
I understand this is going to be very useful later on in our discussion, but 
I think there is a very interesting point where you said, well actually, it 
is almost like risk management, and ultimately, you have to be able to 
show that you are doing this in furtherance of the economic interest of 
the shareholders and not everything that is short term. 
Unfortunately, we have the issue that companies have to report 
quarterly [earnings] and sometimes that is quite hard to launch bigger 
programs for a year, two year, four years that might be costly and yield 
the benefits later on. I think in that sense, but I can see how boards can 
position that and say, “We are not a charity. We are not doing this just 
for charitable endeavors, but we think that ultimately it will benefit our 
company to have more diversity to put in place—for example, offering 
childcare because we want more women on board. We want a different 
outlook on things.” I am taking this as an example, but any of those 
things are quite valid, as are environmental issues. It is just if you learn 
to look at your externalities now, understand them, and try to adjust your 
business model, it might save you an enormous amount of taxes going 
down the line or actually lost sales because the one thing that we will 
eventually talk about on this panel is actually the power of the consumer 
because when the regulation, the regulator, the legislators are not quite 
there. I think that the consumer is moving quite quickly and that will 
also make companies think about the reputational risk. Also, the market 
rates, in terms of lost sales when products are deemed to be sort of very 
much against the current flow. 
MR. SILK: It is value and values. 
MS. BETTS: Exactly, exactly. 
MR. CORTE: Perhaps one area David raised where there is a 
marked difference between Europe and the United States, in terms of the 
fiduciary duties and the liabilities of directors, is in a transactional 
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context. In Europe—and this is true of every jurisdiction that I have 
worked with in Europe, most EU jurisdictions I would say—fiduciary 
duties of directors do not evolve and do not flip to a short-term 
maximization of shareholder value. For example, in a sale context, they 
remain stable, and they continue to look at the interest of the corporation 
and all of its stakeholders, including in a sale context. In the United 
States, there is a Revlon duty that kicks in at some point and that 
probably is a significant difference that allows directors less latitude.7 I 
would suggest that that allows directors in Europe to look at other 
stakeholders in the company in those transactional contexts in a way that 
U.S. directors cannot. 
MR. SILK: That is correct. A director of a Delaware company 
could not take a lower price to sell the company to someone who is 
promising to operate the company in a way that protects the 
environment. That is clearly a difference. 
MR. SIMPSON: Can I just try something else on you guys because 
it cuts against everything that I was saying a little bit earlier? Just to get 
your reaction. So, on the one hand, I think the European director has an 
advantage because there is a reference point to stakeholders. In addition, 
I think they are insulated a little bit more from criticism because there is 
not the same ability to litigate so they could be bolder if they wanted to. 
Let me take the exact opposite argument and say since big investors like 
BlackRock and others have become so clear when it comes to the 
importance of ESG, they are pushing that agenda into the U.S. 
boardroom. I would argue, and Lorenzo, if you agree, but I would argue 
they are not able to as much because European corporations and boards 
are a little bit more protected. So, a little bit more insulated from that 
kind of immediate pressure to pay attention to what the biggest 
shareholders are telling them. Is that fair, or . . . 
MR. CORTE: I think they are more insulated from litigation, but 
they are not more insulated from shareholder votes and for getting 
thrown out of the board. If the BlackRocks or the Vanguards or many 
other of these enormous asset managers decide that they are going to 
focus on ESG, I think their directors will have to respond to that, if they 
want, to continue to be directors of corporations. That is the reality of 
things, I think. 
 
 7. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
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MS. BETTS: Lorenzo, sorry for interrupting, but it is a really good 
point. Everything hinges on voting because we can say a lot of things. 
All investors can say we are going to change the way we look at what 
directors are doing, but unless they actually vote against those directors 
then nothing really changes. So, I think we need to start looking at what 
is happening in the next proxy season and see that all these big investors 
and all the signatories to the Business Roundtable are actually really 
doing it in the trenches. 
MR. SILK: You are right, and we will see, as the next proxy season 
comes along, how meaningful their engagement has been. Engagement 
is not necessarily reflected only in votes; it can also be reflected in 
discussions and other pressure. But it is expectations, not necessarily the 
limits of the law, that drive decisions of directors on ordinary course 
operations on ESG decisions here in the United States, I think. 
MS. BETTS: I think engagement is going to be really big. I think 
people like the New York State Comptroller or people like the 
California State Comptroller. All these people have an enormous voice 
that they can contribute to the dialogue with not just their vote, but with 
their engagement; telling corporations what they are expecting to see, 
and as you say, you do not really see it get resolved before voting. It is 
just like we need to be very mindful that in terms of execution, when 
you look at the vote, there has been historically an awful lot of inertia 
and directors tend to get an endorsement of 90-92%.8 How do you 
challenge the way you do business when you get between 94 and 97% 
positive vote every year? We need to start seeing a little bit of action 
there. 
MR. SILK: I would differ a little bit there. I do think that U.S. 
directors are very responsive to not just votes against their reelection, 
but also to votes in favor of shareholder proposals and other pressure 
from the major shareholders. U.S. companies will be quite responsive to 
the desires of investors like BlackRock and State Street, even if they are 
not actually exercising their vote against those directors, but they are 
threatening to do so. 
 
 8. See Theo Francis, Corporate Board Elections Getting a Little Less Cozy, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-board-elections-getting-a-
little-less-cozy-11570532400 [https://perma.cc/9WBN-JMQL] (citing 2020 Proxy 
Season Review, PROXYPULSE (2020), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/
broadridge-proxypulse-2020-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP66-YLCU]); Regulation 
2019/2088, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on 
Sustainability-Related Disclosures in the Financial Services Sector, 2019 O.J. (L 317) 
1–16 [hereinafter Regulation EU 2019/2088]. 
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MS. BETTS: On a personal basis, I am trained initially as a U.S. 
lawyer, so I understand the context beyond just the pure SEC “sticks.” 
This is very much a more open market, in a way, and I think that in 
terms of ESG, we will see some really good progress there because I 
think, once things get going, boards and directors will be a lot more 
responsive a lot quicker. That is just my expectation. It is probably a bit 
counterintuitive, but I really think we are going to see some fast 
progress in the next 18 to 24 months. 
MR. SILK: I would agree with that. 
AJ HARRIS: How do you think the regimes in the EU differ from 
the United States in terms of the regulatory approach to ESG? Why do 
you think United States regulators have been relatively hesitant to adopt 
the sweeping changes we are seeing in the EU and to what extent do you 
think the private sector led initiatives will effectively supplant the lack 
of regulatory intervention? 
MR. CORTE: Perhaps I should start by giving a picture of what 
Europe has been doing in terms of regulation. Then David can compare 
and contrast where the United States is moving at a very high level, 
because I do not want everybody to fall asleep. In terms of regulation, 
the EU has pursued a program that is aimed at creating some uniform 
standards around ESG disclosure that is critical, because investors are 
demanding that companies and directors respond to a demand to address 
ESG issues.9 All of the issues—environmental sustainability, social and 
governance factors—companies are scrambling to show that they are 
complying and they are responding to this request. The reality is that, 
already this year, we have seen massive capital reallocation as a result of 
the renewed focus on ESG, and so, there is a direct financial interest in 
showing that you have addressed the ESG issues.10 The risk has been, at 
least in Europe, but I think in the States as well, that some companies 
may be advertising ESG compliance or aspects of ESG compliance 
without really having meaningfully done much, or done as much as they 
are advertising they have done. 
 
 9. Anna Maleva-Otto & Joshua Wright, New ESG Disclosure Obligations, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
03/24/new-esg-disclosure-obligations [https://perma.cc/9UUX-ZD97]. 
 10. See JON HALE, MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 
12–13 (2020). 
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So, the objective of these regulations in Europe is to standardize the 
disclosure a little bit.11 It is also very difficult to understand and 
compare and contrast the various statements made by various different 
companies, or the various initiatives advertised by companies. So, the 
objective is to provide some uniform standard of disclosure, to increase 
comparability of companies or ESG compliance, to put some order, and 
allow investors to better pick where they are going to allocate their 
capital, to the extent that some of that decision is based on ESG 
compliance. So, you have seen regulations, such as the taxonomy 
regulation in Europe, the sustainability related disclosure regulation, 
some of which require technical details to be implemented through the 
regulation. However, these regulations coming into force will begin to 
give some shape to the disclosure around ESG and I think that is at a 
European level. 
I also want to add, to give a full picture in Europe that you have got 
actions taken by countries at a jurisdictional level independently of the 
EU.12 Some countries have implemented some very interesting sort of 
legislation that you can agree or disagree with, but it is interesting, 
nonetheless. 
To go back to the background that David gave at the beginning of 
this webinar. France has passed the law that allows companies to 
establish a mission, a purpose, a corporate purpose that is different,13 or 
additional to, that of creating long term value for shareholders. Which is 
quite interesting and kind of brings it back a couple hundred years, in 
that sense as David was suggesting.14 For example, Danone recently 
enshrined in its organizational documents, its “health through food 
mission”, in response to this change in legislation which means that 
going forward, its purpose will be to generate profit for shareholders and 
look after all of it stakeholders.15 But to Stephanie’s points about 
 
 11. See Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, supra note 8. 
 12. See, e.g., European Commission Press Release IP/21/224, Rule of Law: 
Commission Adopts Next Step in the Infringement Procedure to Protect Judicial 
Independence of Polish Judges (Jan. 27, 2021). 
 13. See Blanche Segrestin, Armand Hatchuel & Kevin Levillain, When the Law 
Distinguishes Between the Enterprise and the Corporation: The Case of the New 
French Law on Corporate Purpose, J. BUS. ETHICS (2020), https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10551-020-04439-y [https://perma.cc/NP5P-Z4DZ]. 
 14. Code civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1833 (Fr.). 
 15. See Danone To Pioneer French “Entreprise à Mission” Model To Progress 
Stakeholder Value Creation, DANONE (May 20, 2020), https://www.globenewswire
.com/news-release/2020/05/20/2036111/0/en/Danone-to-pioneer-French-Entreprise-
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consumers, this also benefits its consumers’ health through the food 
products that it sells and beyond that as well. So that is an interesting 
sort of jurisdictional development in France. 
Just to complete the picture, and then I promise I will give the 
speaking stick back to others: The UK is obviously in a bit of an 
awkward situation because of Brexit, which has taken a very long time 
to be implemented. We are still in the transitional phase. Now we are 
going to come out of the transitional phase at the end of December. 
Even if you took the perspective that a lot of what the European Union 
has done in terms of regulation is good, it is a bit awkward to just absorb 
all of that European regulation and national law in this very moment, 
when the UK is transitioning out of the EU. So, I do not think there is 
disagreement in the UK as to whether, for example, the taxonomy 
regulation or the sustainability related disclosure regulation or the 
amendments that are non-financial reporting directive are good. I also 
think the UK will come out of the EU, this transitional period will end, 
and then the UK will implement a lot of its rules on its own terms. Then 
in Europe, I think you will see in other countries as well, there have 
been stock exchanges that have taken matters in their own hands like the 
LSE which has come up with this green economy mark.16 This is kind of 
interesting where based on certain data driven analysis, they determine 
whether a company generates at least 50% of its revenues from green 
products or services and if it does, it is awarded this green economy 
mark which may attract some capital from investors that are just ESG-
focused. So that is kind of a bit of a picture on what is going on in 
Europe, David. 
MR. SILK: In the United States there are a number of different 
regulatory impacts, although many are taking a different direction from 
those in Europe. From the federal government, we are not seeing any 
particular movement in the direction that Europe is moving in. The 
federal government itself is not moving towards and, in some ways, is 
moving away from the sort of regulation that would promote ESG. 
There is no federal press for uniform disclosure. An investor advisory 




 16. Green Economy Mark, LONDON STOCK EXCH. GRP. (Oct. 2020), 
https://docs.londonstockexchange.com/sites/default/files/documents/lseg_green_econo
my_mark_factsheet_issuer_oct_2020_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN5P-SM8E]. 
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develop sustainability metrics, which reflects the real investor hunger 
for, as you say, uniform consistent ESG disclosure, but the SEC under 
the current administration is unlikely to take that up. Similarly, the 
CFTC has a subcommittee that has recently issued a report with literally 
scores of specific recommendations mostly directed at climate change.17 
The Department of Labor (“DOL”) has proposed rules that would make 
it more difficult for trustees of retirement funds to invest in ESG funds 
and would prohibit those trustees from adopting an ESG fund as the 
default in a menu plan.18 Under these rules, if a participant did not 
choose anything else, the plan that the participant would automatically 
be allocated into could not be one with an ESG mandate. So, in that 
respect, DOL seems to be rowing against what feels like the main course 
of the tide. 
On the other hand, there are some states that are proposing and 
passing legislation that is ESG-based. New York State, for example, has 
adopted some legislation that will require New York State and its 
entities using power in New York State to use solely renewable power 
within the next 10 years, with the plan to be in place within the next four 
to five years.19 
There are various cross currents from Europe to the United States. 
One thing that is clearly consistent between the United States and 
Europe is the hunger of investors for consistent and comparable ESG 
metrics. Investors really want to be able to compare across industries 
and across companies within the industries on a basis that does not allow 
 
 17. New Unit Signals CFTC Targeting ESG Issues and Financial System’s Climate 
Risks, JONES DAY (March 22, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-unit-
signals-cftc-targeting-esg-6656297 [https://perma.cc/7UX9-GL2H]; Zachary S. Brez et 
al., CFTC Panel Calls for Sweeping Climate Change Risk Regulation, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Sep. 28, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/cftc-
panel-calls-for-sweeping-climate-change-risk-regulation [https://perma.cc/F8VK-
TZJE]. 
 18. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846 (Nov. 13, 
2020). But see Press Release, U.S. Department of Labor Releases Statement on 
Enforcement of its Final Rules on ESG Investments, Proxy Voting By Employee 
Benefit Plans (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/
ebsa20210310 [https://perma.cc/7WGZ-PLVN]. 
 19. Press Release, Governor Cuomo Announces New Competitive Program to 
Retain New York’s Existing Renewable Energy Resources (Jan. 22, 2021), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-new-competitive-
program-retain-new-yorks-existing-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/XUL5-AMY6]. 
The plan, dubbed “Competitive Tier 2,” aims to procure 70% of electricity consumed in 
the state from renewable energy sources by 2030. Id. 
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for greenwashing. The other area where there is some similarity is that 
Delaware, for example, has also adopted a statute that allows a company 
to form a different type of corporation, a benefit corporation, that has a 
purpose that is not simply the pursuit of profits, but has some other 
social or environmental purpose.20 We have not seen a lot of those 
companies hit the stock exchange, but there are some, and so that theme 
exists in the United States as well. 
MS. BETTS: Well, I agree. If you look at California as well, it is 
incredible how their definition of renewables is so much stricter than 
what we have, even in Europe. So, some companies which we deem as 
renewable in Europe, for let us say, green label, will actually be deemed 
by the State of California to not be renewable because the energy comes 
from different states—it is green energy, but from a different state. 
I think my view, with the United States, is there is actually an awful 
lot happening under the bonnet in terms of ESG. Nobody really wants to 
necessarily put their head way above the path that we are somewhere, I 
think Leo will say, as we know, but the reality is there is an awful lot 
happening. When the gates open, I think we will see that the U.S. is 
probably quite a ways ahead and will suddenly bring some gravitas, and 
some weight to this debate. 
When you look at market caps, very simply, and the importance of 
the U.S. exchanges, the SEC has been very clear. Even Jay Clayton, as 
we know, who has been appointed by the President.21 It has been very 
difficult for him to be very vocal on this, but he has made it clear that if 
companies report on ESG, the SEC will review it, and review the quality 
of the information. So, the key thing is to get those companies to report 
and there might be other ways to do that. 
We talked about the exchanges, and I think the exchanges are in a 
fantastic position to actually declare that companies have to have a 
stable transition. You talk about to stay on pay. What about the sound 
transitions? That is not unthinkable, and if anything, I think that is 
probable. 
 
 20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–365 (West 2021). 
 21. Jay Clayton served as SEC Chairman from May 4, 2017 to December 23, 2020. 
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Biography: Jay Clayton, https://www.sec.gov/biography/
jay-clayton [https://perma.cc/9SBV-NP4U] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021); Press Release, 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Statement of SEC Chairman Jay Clayton Regarding the 
Conclusion of His Tenure (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/clayton-2020-12-23 [https://perma.cc/GVK3-CR9D]. 
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MR. SILK: I agree that in the absence of government regulation, 
there will be organizations that will step in and in fact we do see that in 
the United States. We do not have the same sort of government driven 
standardization, but we do have NGO-driven standardization and the 
investors are pushing the companies to it.22 And if that is not successful 
then exchanges may as well. 
MS. BETTS: Another truth is we do not need to all do the same 
thing in the same way. We like different things in different countries. 
We like our tea differently. I am French and I still cannot make English 
tea the way they like it, like Britain. I think the interesting thing about 
ESG—and I was talking about this with people from the accounting and 
an audit world—is that what matters is that the TCFD framework works 
for everybody.23 TCFD and SASB,24 we are going to get to a point 
where we are going to have a set of building blocks that everybody can 
take home and I think the interesting thing is, each country and each 
zone, will have its own jurisdictional setup, and therefore, we need to 
leave the implementation probably down to regional or country 
specificities. The overriding sense of drive has to be common. 
I know we are talking about ESG, the three facets of it, but if we 
actually brought you into one of the questions, we have here, in terms of 
the architecture of priorities. It is quite obvious now that climate has to 
take the lead because unless we sort out climate, we will not be having 
these conversations in five years’ time. This is a conversation we had 
with Mark Carney; forget 2050, it looks nice on paper, but in reality, this 
is a very different world we are talking about. We have to look at 2030 
at the very latest, because if you look at what the scientists are telling 
you, between negative feedback loops and the vast unknowns, we 
cannot really bank on 2050. 
I think for me, looking at it from the regulatory side of things and 
the practical implementation side of things, I think, let us stand back for 
a minute. What is the spirit of the law? What are we trying to achieve 
here? What are we trying to do? We are trying to get some form of 
 
 22. Frameworks devised by NGOs include Bloomberg, CDP, CDSB and others. 
See Seon Barbera, Edward Greene & Hannah Orowitz, The ABCs of ESG: Initiatives 
and Organizations Issuers Should Understand, GEORGESON (2019), 
https://www.georgeson.com/us/ABCs-of-ESG-Initiatives-and-Organizations-for-Issuers 
[https://perma.cc/MC4P-SFC9]. 
 23. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org [https://perma.cc/E7CS-9EDW] (last visited Aug. 20. 2021). 
 24. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org [https://
perma.cc/FAN7-CR5K] (last visited Aug. 20. 2021). 
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global movement, global compliance where companies are starting to 
take into account the impact of the externalities for 200 plus years, we 
have been growing, developing, buying cars and air conditioning and 
bikes in certain colors. It has been fun and nobody cared, but suddenly, 
it really matters. It is actually vital that we get this sorted and so if you 
look at this, and I would encourage anybody who is listening to these to 
look up someone called Jem Bendell and read that piece called Deep 
Adaptation.25 It is a very extreme view, but it is a view that has to be 
known, because it is just the collation of all the sort of scientific views 
on climate and it really clearly tells you. Well, unless you do something 
yesterday, it is going to be very challenging. 
Now hopefully we are resourceful, and there will be a lot of money 
put into climate tech, into people repurposing their business model. 
There is going to be a lot going on, but I think we need to not lose sight 
of the end goal, which is that we absolutely have to drastically reduce 
the level of emissions globally, whatever it takes in whichever 
jurisdiction. I know there will be lots of debate between developing and 
developed countries. Why is it fair that we had all this time to emit and 
consume as we wished, and now they can’t do the same? It is tough. We 
will have to have those difficult discussions, and we will have to have 
the discussion as to the cost of it and the ultimate cost of not doing it. 
So, there’s going to be some interesting discussion in the next 18 
months or so, but I think countries and jurisdictions should have some 
leeway as to what works best for them. 
So, what works best for the United States, what works best in the 
UK, we will never have uniformity of jurisdiction. In itself, that is not an 
issue, but what matters is that we are aligned on the overarching goal to 
get there. That is really what matters right now. And that is why, for us 
it is looking at, technically, how do we implement that? How do we 
make it work? And I am really convinced that at some point, once the 
United States gets on board officially, things will roll up much quicker 
than we expect. 
MR. SIMPSON: So, this may be an unfair observation, but I think 
that we have seen in Europe, a willingness of the governments to 
intervene, as Lorenzo outlined. I am not necessarily a pro regulation sort 
of person, but in this area, I think there is an advantage currently in 
 
 25. See Jem Bendell, Deep Adaptation: A Map for Navigating Climate Tragedy, 
IFLAS Occasional Paper 2, (revised July 27, 2020), http://www.lifeworth.com/
deepadaptation.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6JB-VAF5]. 
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Europe, where the governments are prepared to intervene. I think there 
is a reluctance in the United States to do so. One question is whether the 
investment community is actually going to drive sufficient fundamental 
change even in the absence of government regulation. 
MR. SILK: That is a fair and open question. Clearly, we are not 
going to have the kind of federal regulation, limiting emissions or even 
driving the limitation of emissions through disclosure that you see in 
Europe under the Trump administration.26 Maybe in a Biden 
administration, we could see some of that. What we have seen during 
the Trump administration, particularly during the last two years, is 
significant pressure bought by the major institutional investors.27 
Whether that will be sufficient to drive the kind of behavior changes that 
you are seeing in Europe is still an open question. 
MS. BETTS: I think between that and the consumer, between the 
big investors, the stock exchange, and the consumer, you are going to 
have a lot of pushing there. In France, you have Emmanuel Macron 
calling people.28 He would call the CEOs and just said on Monday, I 
want you to announce this, and I would like you to do this. So, he was 
very driven, he is very much obviously behind all these efforts in your 
office. He has been very proactive and literally picked up the phone 
because it is France, because we have got the code Napoleon. We 
operate differently in France, so again, I think the implementation would 
be very different from country to country due to cultural differences. 
MR. SILK: Our implementation was not all that different right? We 
had our president tweeting, instead of calling someone on the phone. It 
is just that he was taking the opposite end of the spectrum. 
MS. BETTS: I know, fair enough. 
 
 26. See, e.g., Lisa Woll & Judy Mares, Opinion, The Trump administration wants 
to discourage your 401(k) from including ESG investments options, MARKETWATCH 
(Sep. 8, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-trump-
administration-wants-to-discourage-your-401k-from-including-esg-investment-options-
2020-09-07 [https://perma.cc/ZD7J-AX6Q]. 
 27. See Sara Bernow, Bryce Klempner & Clarisse Magnin, From ‘Why’ to ‘Why 
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MR. CORTE: One observation on disclosure regulation and 
regulation of these types of issues. What I’ve observed in the 20 years 
I’ve worked in this area is that disclosure regulation and the like 
between Europe and the United States has converged quite significantly 
over the years. Regulators talk to one another because ultimately the 
investor market, the BlackRocks, State Streets, Vanguards of this world, 
invest in the United States and they invest in Europe. They are the same 
people really and have the same policies. Ultimately, I think there will 
be a process of convergence between these regulations and disclosure. I 
do think it will take a little bit of time. I think we are at the very 
beginning, even in Europe in terms of regulating this area, right? The 
rules are coming into effect in 2021 and some of them require heaps of 
technical regulation to sort of make them really implementable and 
somewhat intelligible, so I think there will be a process of convergence, 
but I think it is going to take a while. 
MR. SIMPSON: I fully agree, and I do not want to say anything too 
controversial or too negative, but look how long it took to separate the 
chairman role from the CEO role, assuming you think that is a good 
thing. It is a different issue than ESG, but look how long it took U.S. 
companies to align with the separation of those two positions when left 
to the market changing. It took a decade or more, David.29 I think for 
that trend to really take hold and so just if that is an example in the 
absence of some kind of regulatory intervention, I just fear that it is 
going to take a long time for investors and consumers to drive the kind 
of change that I think the science is telling us needs to be made kind of 
yesterday. 
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, but we actually do not have that 
time. I think we need to think of what is happening now, like in the 
olden days, you would have no seat belt. My father used to drive the car 
with cigar out of the window and four kids with no seatbelts happy go 
lucky in the middle of the night. It was brilliant. We look back thinking, 
“We all made it, right?” So, this is unthinkable now, but I think in a few 
years, it will be the same with ESG and disclosure and so on. The 
separation of the CEO and having a lead independent director or the 
 
 29. Charles A. Tribbett, III, Splitting The CEO And Chairman Roles—Yes or No?, 
RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOC’S (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.russellreynolds.com/
newsroom/splitting-the-ceo-and-chairman-roles-yes-or-no [https://perma.cc/ED7H-
BB9D]. 
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Chairman, these are stuck in time for a lot of reasons, cultural reasons, 
etc. 
Also, we did not have the burning urgency. Now if I may say, when 
you look at what is happening in California, California is obviously 
burning and certain parts of Florida are getting a bit under water, as far 
as I can gather. You have things that are happening at a pace that we 
cannot cope with. When you look at what the insurers are seeing and 
what they say in their reports in terms of the accelerations of the 
incidents link to climatic, sort of the range of events. If you want, is 
much higher in terms, more fires of the highest severity. Same thing 
with the floods, it is getting harder to insure the world. Now, none of us 
want to live in a non-insurable world. 
At some point the regulator is going to say it is taking a long time. 
How much time do we really have? Do we want to continue to play nice 
and maybe incentivize CEOs and executive in companies by telling 
them, “If you do good things on climate, we will tie this up to your 
executive compensation to the tune of, let us say, 5%?” That is a bit of a 
joke. So again, this is for me, a form of greenwashing, you say. When 
you look at companies and say how much of your executive 
compensation is linked to climate targets, this is obviously the next thing 
that is going to happen. We need to think in terms of set of incentives, 
we need to think of “where are we now?” We are all working in the 
spirit of a financial system that is fragilized by the climatic events. The 
system is fragile because we are trading on eggshells. A lot of the 
intrinsic value of these companies is challenged by climatic events, but 
currently they are completely insulated, and I think that is the danger. 
MR. SILK: To me the question is, how are we actually going to get 
from the place where we are to the place that you are describing? How is 
that going to be? One choice is regulation, and the other choice is, as 
Scott notes, investor pressure. I think Scott was questioning whether 
investor pressure will actually get us there. To me, Scott, the contrary 
example to separation of CEO and Chair is the elimination of the poison 
pill that happened over a couple of years because that was something 
that investors actually cared about. I do not think that investors cared as 
much or still do care as much of, at least in the United States, about 
separation of Chair and CEO, because I think investors recognize that 
for different companies, you can have a different outcome. 
With respect to uniform disclosure of a basic set of metrics, it is 
clear that many investors want it. Institutional investors are being driven 
by their own customers: The people who are investing their own dollars 
are looking more frequently for an ESG impact with respect to their 
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investment. As the popularity of ESG funds increases, more funds think 
about ways to become “ESG funds,” and more funds need uniform ESG 
disclosure. So, I think it is a different case than the case you suggested. 
MS. BETTS: Nobody thought about a set of the right incentives; 
really, it is how the incentives are set up to get to the right outcomes. 
TAYLOR WELLS: David mentioned a few minutes ago that 
President Trump tweets out policy, whereas Lorenzo mentioned that in 
contrast, regulators tend to talk to each other. Now it seems that there 
are real risks and costs to implementing these standards. Given this 
uncertainty, what other concerns do you have regarding the rollout of 
ESG standards? 
MR. SILK: First of all, what will eventually be rolled out in the 
United States in terms of standards is unclear. I worry about 
inconsistency or failure to achieve the kind of consistency that investors 
are looking for. Personally, the most important goal is getting some kind 
of uniform consistent disclosure because that will allow investors to 
make the decisions they want to make without relying on inconsistent 
ratings agencies that can apply whatever weight they want to whatever 
questions they want. So, the thing that I am worried about is 
inconsistency. 
MR. CORTE: Similarly, David, I think it is similarly, but what I 
worry about in Europe and I always worry about this in Europe is 
overregulation. In other words, Europe has a much more regulatory 
environment than the United States, which is more sort of disclosure 
based. My fear is that regulation is passed with certain objectives in 
mind on a one-size-fits-all basis where that just does not fit the range of 
companies that need to be thought of when you think about ESG and 
disclosure regulation. For some companies, the “S” and the “G” will be 
more important than the “E.” Take for example, a solar energy company 
or wind company, you’re not going to be too concerned with the “E” 
with that kind of company. So, whether you invest in that clean energy 
company as opposed to another clean energy company will probably be 
more about whether they are better addressing the “S” and the “G” than 
the other clean energy company. Since they are both clean energy 
companies, I am a little bit worried about one-size-fits-all regulation that 
causes capital to shift because labels are associated with companies that 
do not really reflect what efforts these companies are making and 
whether they are making a real impact or not. Whether that is in the 
environmental area or in social or governance, that is at least my worry 
for Europe. 
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MR. SIMPSON: I do not disagree. On the other hand, we have seen 
in recent years that deregulation, in particular, in and around 
environmental matters, is a real concern that has set back the ESG 
agenda big time in the United States. If I go back to Stephanie’s point 
about seatbelts, how did that get fixed? The states were refusing to adopt 
the uniform system of regulation, so the federal government stepped in 
and basically said, “If you want to get money for your highways, you 
will have a seatbelt law,” and that is what ultimately brought it. So, I do 
think that the markets will not drive change fast enough and we are 
going to need more intervention on the part of governments and 
regulation. Notwithstanding Lorenzo’s concern about regulation or ill-
conceived regulation, I just do not think we can rely on a market 
solution entirely. 
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, Scott. We might also need to think 
outside the box, we might also see things that we have not seen much 
before like companies coming together and regulators coming together, 
company regulators and investors coming together. I know the Bank of 
England, in particular, has been very, very active in driving these sorts 
of subcommittees and study groups and it has been brilliant. 
One of the things that I found really interesting is looking at things 
like SASB and GRE teams coming together, looking at things like the 
water coalition that started recently led by Coke and Diageo, where 
those big companies that are heavily reliant on water, which is the other 
side of carbon, have come together to try to improve the way they 
manage externalities; but really learning from each other, helping each 
other rather than competing with each other because they know together 
they have to increase the threshold in terms of best practice. 
The other thing that seems to be interesting is that when these big 
companies have to rely on suppliers, suddenly they have to clean up 
their supply chain as well. So, you start to have almost like a domino 
effect where if they can work in sync with a more enlightened regulator 
who listens to what is happening on the ground so that the regulation is 
appropriate and works. So, we try to avoid too many unintended 
consequences which I know is probably on Lorenzo’s mind and is right, 
there is often too many of those. But I think if we can, because of the 
urgency and because of the common goal that we all share at the 
moment. 
Let us forget the non-believers for now, but I really think that we 
are going to see some cohesion around that goal from companies, 
regulators, and legislators. I think we will see some form of an 
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ecosystem starting to take shape with a set of incentives that are put 
together that will start to bring those new behaviors. I really think so. 
Coming back to the point of disclosure quickly and the conformity 
of the disclosure, I think the big thing we will have to be wary of is 
obfuscation versus disclosure. Everybody has got very clever lawyers 
and can actually say an awful lot but not say much and we all know that. 
How do you make company disclose in a way that is relevant, 
significant, easily understandable, very clear, and easily comparable to 
another? I think that to some extent, when the regulation come[s], the 
format of that disclosure is very important, and that is where things like 
SASB, which is a brilliant tool, will be really handy. 
I think there are a lot of ways to look at things in a very sort of 
almost graphic way and the companies that are doing really, really well 
with disclosure at the moment are giving some very good examples—
people like Visa and Microsoft. You can get a really interesting example 
of a very graphic specific disclosure, where there is no room for 
interpretation. For instance, a really good example of that is if you look 
at diversity, companies can write two pages on diversity and how 
amazing they are at recruiting lots of people from everywhere. Then 
they say look at our board, how diverse our board is, how amazing. But 
actually, what you really want to see are those pyramid charts, where 
you see the intake. Then when you see the board, you also want to see 
that they nurture the people that they have taken on board, opening 
broader gates for diversity and that these people are being nurtured all 
the way through the leadership ladder. 
MR. SILK: That can be addressed, right? I mean, if you require 
metrics, you can get metrics. 
MS. BETTS: Exactly. 
TAYLOR WELLS: Shifting more to the future of ESG. What 
would you like to see happen in the ESG space to the next, say, five to 
ten years and how realistic is that? 
MR. SILK: Whether it is a voluntary industry driven disclosure 
framework or a required disclosure framework, I would expect that at 
least in the United States there will be substantial disclosure along some 
kind of a framework, such as SASB plus TCFD or the World Economic 
Forum’s new proposal or the convergence of SASB plus GRI, but I 
would expect within, hopefully even sooner than five years, some kind 
of regular uniform disclosure. I think that would be a very meaningful 
and important development where these kinds of metrics that Stephanie 
was just talking about will be available to shareholders. 
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MR. SIMPSON: I mean, it is a point Lorenzo said a little bit earlier 
and I agree with it. I am an optimist by nature, so I did not mean my 
other comments to be too much of a downer, but I think we can also 
expect David to see the kind of cooperation with a little bit of a wind at 
our back, the same kind of cooperation that we saw between the SEC 
and the European regulators around disclosure. We have seen 
convergence in accounting standards. We have seen convergence around 
prospectus disclosure. There is no reason to not expect to see this kind 
of convergence around ESG disclosure and the SEC and those 
regulators. Its counterparts in Europe have proven their ability to kind of 
get that done on a transatlantic basis that sometimes it takes some time, 
but I think there is a big enough track record. I think a change in attitude 
in Washington DC for that kind of change to come quickly. 
MR. SILK: Yes, I agree with that. 
MR. CORTE: I think what we will see is—several companies have 
done this already—companies instituting governance mechanisms to 
ensure that there is real focus and accountability for ESG.  
The widespread establishment, for example, of sustainability 
committees in addition to an audit committee, to a nomination 
committee, to a disclosure committee, a focused sustainability 
committee, a focused chief sustainability officer. I think, by necessity, 
standards and incentives for management that will drive management to 
make decisions in favor of ESG sustainability. So, whether that is 
environment, whether that is social values or governance, I think 
companies need this. Until companies set themselves up with these 
types of internal infrastructures that are focused on achieving certain 
ESG objectives and until management is appropriately incentivized to 
do so, you can have board decisions, but that is kind of where it stops 
right? 
MR. SILK: To that point, we are beginning to see increased ESG 
elements as part of annual bonus schemes, based on quantifiable goals 
and disclosures ahead of time. People actually have to meet their goals 
in order to get the payout. The other thing I think we will see over time 
is while we are now seeing a rush into ESG funds, many kinds of 
mainstream funds are reclassifying themselves as ESG funds by 
adopting an ESG mandate. I think over time, what we will see is the 
elimination of the ESG funds because every fund will look at ESG as 
just another way of evaluating risk and opportunity. It is another tool in 
the toolkit. 
MS. BETTS: I agree with you, David. Who wants to invest in an 
unsustainable fund? And I agree with you that the whole ESG name will 
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be dropped because it is just a new set of risk metrics that you have to 
manage. 
MR. SILK: So catchy. 
MS. BETTS: The other interesting thing in terms of nudge, we are 
talking about incentives, you get the hardcore incentives of, for 
example, an exchange regulation or a compensation link to 
compensation in terms of ESG matrix. The other interesting one, which 
we have seen is companies that are giving incentives to their suppliers to 
do the right thing from an environmental point of view or ESG point of 
view. So, you get a better pricing, or you get a sort of more long-term 
contracts; you will have some interesting little developments like this, 
which will make it happen on the ground. 
MR. SIMPSON: I think Dianna wants to ask a final question, if I 
got the cue correct. We have been going on, and Dianna, can I just say, 
it has been a fantastic symposium you put together and I mean 
congratulations, I am looking forward to listening to the rest. 
DIANNA LAM: Thank you, you have had a very interesting 
conversation. I do want to present one of the questions that have come 
in. We have gotten quite a few, but we figured this one might be good to 
end it. 
What do you all make of recent research in the review of financial 
studies which suggests that private companies in the United States have 
lower emissions than publicly traded company?30 
MR. SILK: I have to say, I have not seen that research and I am 
very interested to see it. I would have thought that as companies become 
disfavored by the public markets, such as coal and guns, that those 
would fall into private hands. I suppose a countervailing factor is that 
many, many private equity investors, including the pension funds that 
are investing directly in private equity, are pressing ESG on the private 
equity managers in much the same way that the index funds are pressing 
ESG and climate change preparedness on public companies. I suppose it 
is easier to pressure those privately held companies because the 
shareholder base is smaller and individually more influential. 
MR. SIMPSON: Thank you, I would like to see the study as well. I 
mean another possible explanation is that for the time being certain 
public company boards are still whipsawed between the desire of some 
 
 30. See generally Sophie A. Shive & Margaret M. Forster, Corporate Governance 
and Pollution Externalities of Public and Private Firms, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 1296 (Mar. 
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shareholders, some important shareholders to push ESG and other 
shareholders who are more focused on short termism. While they are 
whipsawed, they are a little slower to act than as you say, David, a 
private company that has a core investor with a clear vision. It is the 
only thing I can think of and hopefully over time that whipsawing will 
be eliminated, and directors of public companies will follow the 
important ESG directives. 
MR. CORTE: To Stephanie’s point and to the point that is being 
made more generally, smaller companies do not have to report their 
results quarterly, right? So, they can take a very long-term view. That 
might be an explanation. 
MR. SILK: But if whoever asked that question can send us the link 
to the study. 
MR. SIMPSON: Yes, we would all be interested. 
MS. BETTS: We are all keen to see it. 
DIANNA LAM: We have it and we will definitely send it to you. 
MR. SILK: Great, thank you. 
DIANNA LAM: So, this concludes the first panel. Thank you all so 
much for coming today and providing your insight, we will break for 




DIANNA LAM: The second panel will discuss Stakeholders as the 
driving force of ESG. Again, the last 10 minutes are reserved for the 
audience. Please type your questions in the chat box. I will now turn it 
over to the committee members who will engage in this dialogue with 
our panelists Carmen Lu, Lisa Fairfax, and David Webber. 
AJ HARRIS: Welcome, everyone. To get started on today’s panel, 
can we talk about some of the ways to quantifiably measure and 
communicate the impact of an organization’s ESG efforts on its 
stakeholder satisfaction and retention? 
MS. LU: AJ, I think there are many ways to measure, quantify and 
communicate an organization’s ESG efforts. One of the most common 
methods that is currently done is to engage in ESG reporting through 
stand-alone ESG reports. There are a number of major frameworks, for 
example, SASB;1 GRI, the Global Reporting Initiative;2 and TCFD,3 
which focuses on climate-related impacts. These frameworks all provide 
various metrics that allow companies to demonstrate how they are 
performing on ESG. 
Another pathway for communicating ESG efforts, and which many 
companies are adopting, is providing disclosure on their website.  
On a growing number of company websites, you will see information on 
the company’s ESG goals, such as goals relating to employees or 
relating to the treatment of suppliers and engagement with local 
communities. In addition, we are also seeing active engagement between 
companies and their key investors discussing critical ESG issues such as 
diversity and inclusion, adaptation to climate change risks, and so forth. 
 
† Panel 2 was moderated by symposium editor Dianna Lam and symposium committee 
members AJ Harris, Nicole Mecca, Avery Golombek, Taylor Wells, and Marie 
Bogenez. 
 1. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org [https://
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MS. FAIRFAX: I will just weigh in, Carmen. First, I want to say 
thank you so much for having me here today. It has been a very 
engaging conversation so far, and I am so happy to be a part of this 
discourse. 
As Carmen suggests, there are all kinds of ways in which 
companies communicate their efforts. I think the last statistic I saw said 
something like 85% or 86% of S&P 500 companies have some type of 
sustainability report, and I think that statistic was from two years ago—
they do it voluntarily, often on their website and in other forums.4 I do 
think that one of the interesting trends that is a positive one is the effort 
to try to push that communication into the proxy statement. I think that 
one of the concerns about the voluntary reporting and the reporting in 
different locations is there is not as much board oversight with respect to 
what is going in those documents. Maybe that could have an impact on 
whether and to what extent boards prioritize the goals and the targets 
that are there. So, I do think that in terms of thinking about effective 
communication, one piece of it is trying to push that information into the 
proxy statement, especially when it is in the proxy statement that there is 
an overt recognition that investors also want to be communicated with 
about that type of information. It is not just something going out to other 
stakeholders. 
I will also say that Carmen is right. There is so much information. 
One of the concerns is that it is too much, and that we are not being 
thoughtful enough about the nature of the information that is being 
produced and making sure that it is useful because, at times, it is 
overinclusive, and at other times, it is underinclusive. Certainly, there 
have been a lot of complaints about the lack of uniformity. 
We know there are all kinds of ways in which we saw this on the 
first panel, what people mean by the “E,” the “S,” and the “G.” How are 
they measuring it? What does it mean for their company? Sometimes 
that is difficult to discern at a particular company because the lack of 
uniformity makes it difficult to make comparisons across companies and 
across industries. When we think about effective communication, it is 
also about trying to have some type of understanding about the 
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appropriate information and how we can at least find some uniformity 
with regard to that information. 
This is my plug for saying that while the market has been a good 
source of driving information, in order to get really effective disclosure, 
it is probably going to require something more, so that the disclosure 
can be useful across companies and industries. 
MR. WEBBER: I agree. Standardization is obviously critically 
important to developments like SASB,5 and others are moving things in 
that direction. But of course, it is always the classic problem of making 
the apples to apples comparisons and needing to be able to do that.  
The only other point I would emphasize—and I do not have much to add 
to what Carmen and Lisa just said—but picking up on Carmen’s point 
about the shareholder engagement piece: look at what BlackRock and 
State Street have done in terms of announcing policies like gender 
diversity targeting, increased gender diversity in corporate boards, 
voting along those lines, engaging with corporate managers on those 
subjects. Obviously, they are big voices and they wield significant 
market carrots and sticks, and certain investors do indeed have  
a significant role to play in driving these changes inside companies.  
I think many other institutions follow along or take their cues from that. 
It will be interesting to see what new issues those institutions pick up in 
the coming years, and how particular issues get onto their agendas or 
not, because that in and of itself has a significant role in the future 
development of ESG in the marketplace. 
MS. LU: On Lisa and David’s point about the lack of 
standardization, it has definitely been a key source of concern for 
investors and various other stakeholders. The often-asked question is: 
How do you measure companies’ performances using metrics that are 
not directly comparable? As a result, we have seen efforts to reach 
agreed-upon disclosure metrics and standards, notably from the World 
Economic Forum, whose recently released reporting framework aims to 
standardize the ESG reporting process and draws from existing 
frameworks, such as GRI and SASB. 
It will be interesting to see what happens in the next couple of 
months or so, and whether companies and investors coalesce around one 
uniform framework. It will also be interesting to see how the disclosures 
are used by investors, stakeholders, various third-party ratings agencies, 
and proxy advisory services. How disclosures are used will in turn 
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impact how companies choose to report their ESG performance in the 
long term. 
MS. FAIRFAX: This question about shareholders and how they are 
engaging around ESG is really interesting, because they are helping to 
fill in the bubble as to what counts as “E,” what counts as “S,” and what 
counts as “G.” So there is a push around diversity, for example, that 
obviously has been something that has been on many stakeholders’ 
radars and companies’ radars, but then you start seeing larger 
shareholders pushing forward. All of a sudden, the bubble gets filled in a 
little darker as we think about normalizing the notion that is part of the 
ESG framework. It is very interesting to think about how those issues 
get shaped. 
MR. WEBBER: Absolutely, if you look at the lifecycle on 
environmental issues and environmental shareholder proposals.  
In the beginning, they were brought by sort of smallish, some would say 
fringe, ESG investors when ESG was still considered a quixotic thing,  
a tiny market niche. Then you had other institutions, some of the big 
public pension funds and others started to pick up on it and that raised 
the profile of it. It also raised the kind of vote totals and shareholder 
proposals. We then hit 2017, and for the first time we started to see 
some of the biggest players in the markets vote in favor of those 
proposals; notably, proposals that they did not bring themselves, but 
they did start to vote in favor of them a little bit. We have seen a little bit 
more of that since and so that is one kind of interesting life cycle of how 
you watch an issue like this move from the periphery into the core and 
how it gets there. That is one pattern of how this stuff evolves, and 
standardization has a role to play, too, but keep an eye on that particular 
channel through which these issues become central. 
AJ HARRIS: If I can pick up on something that David mentioned: 
board diversity. Lisa, you have been writing about this for over 10 years 
now. Could we get your thoughts on what you are seeing in today’s 
environment, and how it relates to the work that you have done? 
MS. FAIRFAX: Yes, I have written in this area. It is a kind of glass 
half-empty, glass half-full situation happening. I will wear my “glass 
half-full optimism hat” first. There is a lot of momentum. There is  
a push by some of these major players. The big three—Vanguard, State 
Street, and BlackRock—have all kind of made diversity one of the chief 
considerations that they are engaging around and that they will vote 
around, and that has really increased the momentum, particularly with 
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regard to gender diversity. Last year, for the first time in history, every 
single company in the S&P 500 had at least one woman on its board.6 
Last year we have seen record numbers of new directors who are women 
and more than any other group of people who are new directors.  
So, there has just been this huge momentum behind diversity efforts.  
But I have got to say, even with the glass half-full, I am much more 
pessimistic about Blacks and people of color than I am about women. 
My work over 10 years has suggested that there has not really been 
much progress in that area, and even though it is the case that diverse 
directors are making up some ground with larger percentages of new 
directors, it is also the case that 2019 studies show that Black directors 
account for only 1% of the total board seats at S&P 500 companies.7  
A full 37% of those companies had no Black directors on their board at 
all, and that is concerning, especially because throughout the time that  
I have been writing about this, there have been professions that really 
think this is important. Most studies say that social movements really 
have not moved the needle that much, so I think there is cause for 
concern there. 
I will say two things about why I think there is real cause for 
concern. One is that there continues to be this pattern where Black 
directors and directors of color are “overboarded,” or at least holding 
multiple board seats in ways that white directors do not. Even when you 
think about the numbers in percentages, it is overcounting because they 
reflect a small subset of people. I saw one CNN article about a Black 
person who had held 14 board seats through his lifetime,8 and that is 
reflective of the insular nature of the board search process. The vast 
majority of people get on boards based on the people that they know. 
Increasing Black representation poses challenges that adding white 
 
 6. Jeanne Sahadi, For the First Time, There’s a Woman on Every S&P 500 Board. 
But They’re Still in the Minority, CNN BUS. (Dec. 17, 2020, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/16/success/women-sp-500-board-directors/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/5C9U-M8NK]. 
 7. DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, DIVERSITY IN THE C-SUITE: THE DISMAL 
STATE OF DIVERSITY AMONG FORTUNE 100 SENIOR EXECUTIVES, ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AT STAN. U. No. CGRP-82 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587498 
[https://perma.cc/QW77-Q4RL]. 
 8. Sara Ashley O’Brien, He’s Served on 14 Boards. Now He Wants Companies to 
Find Other Black Candidates, CNN BUS. (July 24, 2020, 9:35 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/24/tech/barry-lawson-williams-black-board-
representation/index.html [https://perma.cc/XKD4-YRLF]. 
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women may not.9 Most of the women elected to the boards are white 
and selected because they had professional connections with the white 
men who still dominate boardrooms.10 
Similar networks between white corporate leaders and potential 
Black directors are less well-developed. In an interview, a prominent 
board member mentioned that in white America, she does not know that 
everyone even knows a Black person. What does that mean for this 
process that relies so heavily on social and informal networks? It means 
that we are in this loop of doing the same thing over and over again and 
expecting different results. Somebody told me this was insanity, but I do 
not think it is. 
MS. LU: Just picking up on Lisa’s comment regarding 
“overboarding” of individual Black directors, one of the big issues that 
companies and investors have started to realize must be tackled is the 
pipeline problem. One contributing factor to having overboarded women 
directors or overboarded Black directors is the absence of a large 
number of Black, of color, and female candidates moving through the 
ranks into senior management that prepares individuals to have the right 
skill set and experiences that make them ideal director candidates.  
As a result, you have certain individuals who are qualified, but find 
themselves being asked to serve on multiple boards and then finding 
themselves stretched thin as a result. This problem is going to continue 
to compound as investors and stakeholders continue to call for greater 
gender diversity and racial diversity on boards unless greater attention is 
being paid to the need to develop a credible pathway for diverse 
individuals to rise through the corporate ranks. I think one of the issues 
that investors and other stakeholders are realizing is that it is not simply 
enough to have board diversity. It is also important that there is 
workforce diversity, and that diversity also occurs in middle 
management and throughout the entire company. Whereas in the past,  
a lot of diversity and inclusion initiatives were siloed in one particular 
part of the corporate structure, people are now realizing that perhaps it is 
important to combine these efforts with the HR function in order to help 
create diverse boards in an organic manner over the long term. 
 
 9. Jeff Green, After Adding More Women to Boards, Companies Pivot to Race, 
BLOOMBERG QUINT (Aug. 19, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
onweb/companies-seek-more-black-directors-after-adding-women 
[https://perma.cc/2B2J-3R3X]. 
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316 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
MR. WEBBER: So, if this issue is going to move from glass half-
empty to glass half-full, I think that what we have to keep an eye out for 
is: Can the question of racial diversity and corporate boards follow the 
same path that was followed with environmental issues, and more 
recently with gender diversity issues? 
Some investors are raising it and pushing it into the center of the 
agenda. It is not going to get there on its own, just like it did not get 
there on its own with the two issues that I just mentioned. Is there  
a cause for optimism? I do not know, but I would just point to a couple 
things. First, last week the Business Roundtable issued a statement and  
a set of objectives, specifically focusing on issues of race and inequality 
in the United States.11 It did not get as much attention as last year’s 
departure from shareholder privacy, but it is out there. 
A number of companies are indeed facing a lot of controversy 
regarding the way they handle these issues. Companies that have  
a workforce that is less than 5% Black have now committed to much 
higher hiring targets.12 The Black Lives Matter marches this summer 
pursued high-profile ways of raising this issue on social media and 
targeted companies for doing virtue signaling, but not actually taking 
any action on these issues. Many companies have announced increased 
hiring targets by race, so there is so much yet to be done and I am not 
asserting that this is going to happen tomorrow. I would like to believe 
that it is not just rhetoric here and that some real numbers have been 
targeted, but it remains to be seen. California recently adopted some 
targets for corporate boards along not just gender diversity, but also 
taking into account race and ethnicity and other criteria.13 
 
 11. Business Roundtable Chairman Doug McMillon Establishes Special Committee 




 12. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Kevin Draper, Adidas Pledges to Increase Diversity. 
Some Employees Want More, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/business/adidas-black-employees-discrimination.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y629-CS4T]. 
 13. Anne Steele, California Lawmakers Back Mandate for Racial Diversity on 
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NICOLE MECCA: I agree, and I think this is a great time to shift 
to a discussion of the workplace. What might signal that a company is 
simply virtue signaling on an ethical issue like D&I, as opposed to 
generating and maintaining organizational and cultural change? 
MS. FAIRFAX: I think it is really important when we talk about 
the diversity issue. Just to address the pipeline thing that Carmen has 
raised—I love the way that she talked about it because she talked about 
the changes that needed to occur in the workforce. I actually would go  
a step farther and say that the so-called “pipeline problem” is a problem 
created by the corporations themselves, who are not doing enough to 
effectively hire, promote, and retain people of color in diverse 
workforces. 
Every study, including the most recent one by the Harvard Business 
Review, basically says what we all know.14 There continues to be 
discrimination in hiring, promotion in the workforce, etc. It is 
problematic for companies to suggest that there is a problem and not to 
acknowledge that they are the problem, that they are the ones clogging 
the pipeline, if you will, in this area. I also think it is super important to 
keep in mind that the pipeline becomes self-fulfilling because too often 
companies do not look beyond title and do not focus enough on skill 
sets, despite the fact that empirical evidence suggests that boards that 
rely too much on CEOs actually do not perform well.15 That is not a 
good proxy for good board performance—and yet to suggest that this is 
the reason why we cannot find qualified people or why we cannot find 
enough does not delve deeply enough into who gets deemed qualified 
for these purposes. For the most part, boards can appoint anybody they 
want to their board. There is no corporate law or securities law, other 
than if you need a financial expert, that says who has to be on your 
board. That is why there are some boards that have family members, 
insiders, friends of friends, etc. So, I think we need to be mindful of how 
people define the problem. I also think it is important to interrogate that 
explanation or rather what I call “that excuse” to determine what it 
really means, and how it may be getting in the way of real progress. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian et al., Hiring Discrimination Against Black 
Americans Hasn’t Declined in 25 Years, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/10/hiring-discrimination-against-black-americans-hasnt-declined-
in-25-years [https://perma.cc/6V5P-64T8]. 
 15. Jeffery Sonnenfeld et al., What CEOs Really Think of Their Boards, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Apr. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/what-ceos-really-think-of-their-boards 
[https://perma.cc/X82G-LPM2]. 
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NICOLE MECCA: We can also shift to how employees can hold 
their employers accountable to providing fair employment practices 
such as fair benefits compensation and quality management. 
MS. LU: Thanks, Nicole. Just circling quickly back to your first 
question about how you can tell when companies are virtue signaling as 
opposed to ensuring real change is happening in their workforce—I 
think this is where disclosure comes into play. A lot of the information 
that would be useful for holding companies accountable is not currently 
required to be made public, but would be disclosed under the ESG 
disclosure frameworks. Examples of such information include 
information on gender diversity, employee retention rate, and how 
employees are being promoted through the ranks. All this data is going 
to be very helpful, especially when collected over the long term, for 
identifying which companies are truly concerned about creating real 
change and promoting D&I in their workforce. I think, in the long term, 
what disclosure also allows is for employees, as well as other 
stakeholders, to actively engage with companies to ensure their 
accountability. 
We have already started to see the first examples of investor push 
for fairly aggressive disclosures. For example, over the summer, the 
New York City Comptroller and a couple of pension funds asked 
companies to disclose actual EEO-1 data.16 We also have ISS asking for 
information from company boards about their gender and ethnicity 
makeup.17 So as long as investors continue to push for this data to 
become public, I think we are going to see greater strides. At least we 
will be better equipped to identify those companies who are paying lip 
service to diversity and those who are outperformers. 
MR. WEBBER: I will just add that first of all, the New York City 
pension funds have been at the forefront of these issues for decades, 
engaging the “G” really seriously about five or six years ago, and 
 
 16. SCOTT M. STRINGER, NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, Comptroller Stringer, 
NYC Funds Escalate Campaign Calling on Major Companies to Publicly Disclose 
Workforce Demographics (Dec. 10, 2020), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/
comptroller-stringer-nyc-funds-escalate-campaign-calling-on-major-companies-to-
publicly-disclose-workforce-demographics [https://perma.cc/FEF2-LY5W]. 
 17. ISS Policy Changes for 2021: Increased Expectations for Diversity and 
Accountability, FENWICK & WEST LLP (2020), https://www.fenwick.com/insights/
publications/iss-policy-changes-for-2021-increased-expectations-for-diversity-and-
accountability [https://perma.cc/CG3A-GBP2]. 
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pushing for proxy access after it was struck down by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, pushing environmental issues.18 
Carmen just made the point on D&I issues, and I think this also just 
leads into the discussion about human capital management and the 
SEC’s recent action there.19 I would have liked to see them go further, 
but it was a step, I think, in the right direction. I think it raises a really 
important point that Lisa touched on very briefly earlier, but it is really 
part of the problem—the classic cliché, “you manage what you 
measure.” There has been so much historical emphasis on the C-suite, 
on executive compensation, on executive performance, on the 
backgrounds of executives and board members, and so on and so forth. 
The securities laws emphasize disclosure of that kind of 
performance and compensation. Lisa suggested earlier, in some ways, 
the problem with that particular kind of emphasis is it reinforces  
a misleading narrative for investors, and a misleading political 
narrative—perhaps that is what really matters. “It is the five people at 
the top. We will tell you everything you need to know about corporate 
performance.” And that is just badly misleading. I think it is an artifact 
of the sort of ideology of the CEO as superstar that we had back from 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, the Jack Welch’s and the “Chainsaw Al” Dunlaps, 
people like that, before we really had this sharper move towards 
shareholder activism. 
I think that the human capital management idea is going to allow 
investors to peer much more deeply into corporate practices along all of 
these dimensions. For example: D&I, but also everything that you 
mentioned in your question too about benefits—compensation, training, 
how you build effective workforces that do a good job, are committed to 
the work, and are also rewarded for that work. So, I think there is a 
growing realization and some movement in the right direction. We need 
to be able to look more deeply. It is one thing to target board diversity 
along a number of dimensions, but absolutely if we are going to make 
these kinds of needed changes, we have to be able to peer more deeply 
into the organization. 
MS. FAIRFAX: There is almost nothing that I can add. You have 
both said it right. This is what we mean by human capital management 
 
 18. See generally Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 19. See Press Release, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rule Amendments to 
Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under 
Regulation S-K (Aug. 26, 2020), [hereinafter Regulation S-K amendments], 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192 [https://perma.cc/3FZM-VUSZ]. 
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and why it is so important. You have all these studies talking about the 
importance of intangible assets and their growth as a percentage of  
a company’s market value.20 There is growing concern that we do not 
know enough about how companies pay attention to these issues. What 
are they doing about their D&I practices? What are they doing about 
their labor pool and how stable it is? What does worker turnover look 
like? How are they training their employees? We do not know enough 
about how they are developing people for promotion, and as it turns out, 
that is important information for us to understand. We cannot keep 
thinking about employees as this financial outlay; they are a critical 
asset that needs to be appropriately managed around all of these issues, 
including the diversity issue, as we think about the demographic shifts in 
the population. We must consider what that means for a company that is 
not appropriately managing its labor pool so that they can take 
advantage of those shifts in multiple different ways. 
I agree absolutely that you cannot solve the concerns associated 
with the workforce by getting information about the CEO’s salary, but  
I think the disclosure around it was intended to respond to a different 
concern. So it is not as if that information is not important. It is that it is 
not going to really drive and help this other human capital management 
piece, and we do need more information on that piece in order to really 
understand how companies are doing in this area, an area that is 
critically important. 
NICOLE MECCA: Thank you. To continue the conversation 
around the term human capital management, the SEC has waded into 
this topic with its recent amendment to Regulation S-K.21 In particular, 
what can we expect from the SEC’s latest rule? 
MS. FAIRFAX: I have to fully disclose here that I was on the 
investor advisory committee when we recommended that the SEC focus 
on this issue. Certainly, the new rule falls very short of what we were 
hoping would happen around this. 
It is a step in the right direction, but the problem is there is no real 
guidance and no specific disclosure requirements. There is sometimes 
merit to a principle-based approach, I think, but in this case, we do not 
really have the kind of detailed disclosure guidelines we were just 
 
 20. See, e.g., AON, 2019 INTANGIBLE ASSETS FINANCIAL STATEMENT IMPACT 
COMPARISON REPORT (Apr. 2019), https://www.aon.com/getmedia/60fbb49a-c7a5-
4027-ba98-0553b29dc89f/Ponemon-Report-V24.aspx [https://perma.cc/DW3G-C8AR]. 
 21. See Regulation S-K amendments, supra note 19. 
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talking about. There is also no direction about what kind of information 
is salient or important. By way of example, it would have been a good 
way to start in terms of thinking about what kind of information we need 
to know to have a really good understanding of what companies are 
doing in this area. While I think on the one hand, it acknowledges that 
human capital management is important and that we need to see 
information on it—in terms of doing something beyond that, I will take 
a wait-and-see approach. 
MS. LU: Speaking generally on the SEC and its approach to ESG,  
I think the general approach and view taken by the SEC has been that of 
regulatory caution. It has very much stood by its principle of “you 
should disclose what is material to investors,” but the SEC has not gone 
so far as recommending or requiring any specific ESG-style disclosures, 
which is something that you actually do see across the Atlantic.  
EU regulators have been a lot more forthright about mandating ESG-
specific disclosures and that is something that the SEC has so far 
declined to do. In terms of where we are going to get this information,  
a lot of the pressure and momentum is going to come from the private 
sector, namely initiatives from investors, and companies that really want 
to demonstrate their leadership. So we will see a lot of development 
coming out of the private sector in the United States rather than seeing 
the SEC really taking the lead on these issues for now. 
AVERY GOLOMBEK: With respect to ESG in the lifecycle of  
a pension fund investment, could you speak to the types of conflicts that 
arise in ESG-related negotiations between pension funds and general 
partners? 
MR. WEBBER: Sure, there are a lot of different ways to look at 
that particular question. We were just talking about the New York City 
Comptroller. Why don’t I touch on some interesting stuff that they have 
done? 
Recently, New York City adopted a responsible contractor policy 
which applies to investments in infrastructure and in real estate.  
The purpose of the responsible contractor policy is that when we make 
such investments, we expect that responsible contractors are hired to do 
the work; responsible contractors are those who deploy and pay 
prevailing wages and benefits to workers and have strong safety records. 
They do not have lots of litigation against them. Part of their assessment 
in adopting that policy was investment-driven in the sense that work 
sites that are run by union labor may have fewer accidents, less 
litigation, better training, better compensation, and so forth. 
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So what do you get from policies like that? The funny thing is, all 
this sounds very new. But the reality is ingrained in the history of the 
AFL-CIO housing investment trusts, the AFL-CIO Building Investment 
Trust, and another entity called ULLICO—the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company—it was actually founded by Samuel Gompers, who 
also founded the AFL-CIO. Initially, it was created to write life 
insurance policies for workers for industrial accidents when no one else 
would write such policies—it is still around. It has been around for 
many decades and they have always had investment practices where 
they invest in projects where those projects hire union labor. 
Right now, ULLICO is investing alongside Carlyle in building 
Terminal One at JFK Airport.22 These investments are going on across 
the country, and they are going on through and with private equity funds 
that are investing in these projects with them. This is part of the deal 
between New York City and other pension funds and P.E. firms engaged 
in these types of projects. I think that this is one way forward for labor 
and pension funds on the “S” part of ESG. 
I would like to spin an optimistic scenario for a second, if we are 
still allowed to have any optimism. There is widespread recognition that 
there are serious infrastructure deficiencies in the United States, and 
potentially trillions of dollars of investment in that space.23 One can tell 
a story in which worker pension funds can play a role of investing in 
those types of projects while creating union jobs, and importantly 
bringing new workers and new contributors into these pension funds. 
I will not dwell on it, but this is where there is often a breakdown 
between shareholder returns over in one corner, and on environmental or 
social benefits being something totally different. The reality is that these 
things can be self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing, so pension funds can 
get there without just operating on returns. There are three legs to the 
stool: returns, worker contributions, and employer contributions.  
So those are really big issues for multi-employer pensions, for labor 
 
 22. See Press Release, THE CARLYLE GRP., The New Terminal One at JFK 
Continues Progress with Approval of Proposed Lease by The Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey’s Board (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.carlyle.com/media-
room/news-release-archive/new-terminal-one-jfk-continues-progress-approval-
proposed-lease [https://perma.cc/92A2-CJMX]. 
 23. See Jim Tankersley, Biden Details $2 Trillion Plan to Rebuild Infrastructure 
and Reshape the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/03/31/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-plan.html [https://perma.cc/4DUU-
ALUE]. 
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union funds, and for public pension funds. This is one potential way to 
look at the model between pension fund investors and private equity 
funds—the point was made in the earlier panel today. 
In the private equity space, these pension funds are estimated—
public pension funds in particular—to constitute somewhere between  
a third and up to 50% of total assets under management by private 
equity.24 That is an opportunity for these funds to exercise a lot of say 
over how that money is invested, how it is deployed, and importantly, 
how it should not be deployed. I think we are going to see more of that 
going forward. 
MS. FAIRFAX: I want to add that I have done a lot of work around 
shareholder activism and engagement.25 What that work has surfaced is 
that there are a lot of areas in which PE and pension funds are aligning 
where you would not classically expect. One of the reasons why the 
governance pushes were so successful was not just because of activist 
shareholders, but because of the alliances that those shareholders were 
able to build amongst other shareholders and the shareholder base. 
While it is true that shareholders may have competing and different 
interests, there are some ways in which they have found common 
ground. They have been able to work together in interesting ways and 
we are going to see that play out. 
What these mini-cycles of financial stress have demonstrated is that 
everything is interconnected. It is not that what David is talking about in 
terms of pension fund investment is different—it means that when you 
name a particular shareholder, underneath that shareholder is probably 
other types of shareholders, who may have the ability to find some 
common ground around things that they are concerned about. 
MS. LU: We all talk about major institutional investors—
BlackRock, State Street, the major pension funds—really being at the 
forefront of pushing for ESG, but sometimes we forget the reason why: 
because, as Lisa mentioned, they are investing on behalf of ordinary 
people. As millennials and the generations below them enter the 
 
 24. See OECD, ANNUAL SURVEY OF LARGE PENSION FUNDS AND PUBLIC PENSION 
RESERVE FUNDS 6 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/finance/survey-large-pension-funds.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9YCV-EB5U]. 
 25. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, 
Impact, and Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 
99 B.U. L. REV. 1301 (2019); Lisa M. Fairfax, Social Activism Through Shareholder 
Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (2019); Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder 
Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased 
Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1 (2008). 
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workforce, their priorities on how their money should be invested differ 
from previous generations.26 
Institutional shareholders must align their investment strategies 
with the demands and concerns of their clients, and there is a major 
grassroots push that is driving the current wave of focus on ESG. I think 
we will see the trend continue to accelerate in parallel with demographic 
changes where millennials, women, and minorities continue to accrue 
greater wealth. 
MR. WEBBER: I will make just one more point here about 
pensions, private equity, and ESG to kind of illustrate how chasing 
returns to the exclusion of everything else can have very perverse 
effects. One of the things that I looked at in some earlier work was 
public pension fund investments in privatization.27 You had public 
pension funds that were investing through private equity in the 
privatization of prisons, privatization of schools, privatization of public 
school services, privatization of firefighting, privatization of police and 
security, all the way down the line. 
I interviewed someone who worked as a custodian at a school in 
Massachusetts. He had been making $20 an hour, worked there for 
many years, had good benefits.28 His public pension was invested in  
a private equity pool that turned around and bought Aramark, which 
then came into that town and underbid the union for the school’s 
contract. This guy, who had been making $20 an hour, was offered his 
old job back for $8.50 an hour. This was financed with his own 
retirement funds. 
This was not an isolated case—this was a problem with public 
pension funds investing in private equity. You may say, “What if there 
were good returns on the investment?” But a lot of these workers lost 
their jobs. That is a loss of payments into the funds by both the workers 
and the employers themselves. So it is not so easy to just tease out. That 
is an example where even good return on investment could undermine 
 
 26. See LPL FINANCIAL, How Different Generations Invest, WEBSTER NEWS (July 
8, 2020), https://public.websteronline.com/articles/investments-insights/how-different-
generations-invest [https://perma.cc/HM8B-2QGN]. 
 27. See David H. Webber, Opinion, Protecting Public Pension Investments, WASH. 
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the fund itself, which we think of as not being possible, but it is 
possible. 
We increasingly see this kind of pattern emerging in other parts of 
ESG, in particular in the “E” space. There is increasingly a kind of 
collapse between returns and other forms of benefits to these funds that 
are making these investments. 
MS. FAIRFAX: It shows that the issue is extremely complicated. 
MR. WEBBER: I agree. 
AVERY GOLOMBEK: One of the fiercest critics of ESG and 
stakeholder capitalism has been Lucian Bebchuk, who has argued that 
stakeholder capitalism and the tenets of ESG would reduce management 
and board accountability.29 How should boards and management parse 
through different stakeholder interests and manage potential conflicts? 
MS. FAIRFAX: I think that the concern that Bebchuk raises is one 
that often gets raised in this conversation: For whom should the board 
and the corporation govern? Is the obligation strictly to shareholders and 
their profit maximization concerns? That is a single-choice proposition, 
whereas obligations to groups of stakeholders involves the possibility 
that the board and management can play groups off of one another. 
Accountable to everyone essentially means accountable to no one; 
that is the argument. While you can understand that concept, I think his 
argument ignores the reality that boards and managers are already doing 
this. This is actually what we expect them to do. We expect them to 
balance the interest of different stakeholders. If you imagine this 
moment right now, where corporations are struggling to decide what to 
do during the pandemic, they have on the one hand employees whose 
health and safety concerns they have to think about. On the other hand, 
they have consumers, but this is what they are in the business of doing. 
They have to be in the business of what they are doing in order to 
manage and oversee a large corporation, so I think the reality is that they 
are already doing this. 
The reason why I suggest it is not a concern is that they are already 
doing it. What I think is important about naming the fact that they are 
doing it is so that we are able to spotlight it and really be able to figure 
out who is doing it well. Shedding light on best practices is the whole 
 
 29. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of 
Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 2, 2020) 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-
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point. The business endeavor is about people making decisions, some of 
them that may work and others that may fall flat. 
We have got to try to figure out which ones work and which ones 
do not. How to make tradeoffs is the whole point of this endeavor.  
By allowing people to engage in potentially risky tradeoffs where there 
is no particular right answer, you are just trying to kind of do the best by 
the institution. So to the extent that is concerning, of course it is, but that 
is business. That is my view. 
MR. WEBBER: I think that the Bebchuk concern is real, but I think 
it is also overstated and may not even be that real—I am not so sure. 
Lisa already stated the premise of that critique, which is if we all know 
there is only one score and one metric that matters, we can hold 
everybody accountable to share price and that is it. If you loosen it up at 
all and say, we care about the environment or we did this for workers, 
then there goes the accountability. Realistically speaking, we tend to 
evaluate companies in light of their competitors, in light of other entities 
of the industry. If one entity’s share price is getting pummeled, and they 
claim that they are only getting pummeled because they are doing all 
this great stuff for workers and for the environment—I think it is going 
to be looked at skeptically. It is a question of being able to balance these 
things to let whole industries move in particular directions. 
Secondly, I think that there is more to life than just managerial 
accountability. The reality is it does not tell us enough about whether 
this is the right direction to move. There might well be a little bit less 
managerial accountability because they are taking other things into 
consideration. What we really want to know is, maybe so, but we can 
still benefit overall from managers being able to take other things into 
consideration along these other dimensions. The single-minded focus on 
just the issue of managerial accountability is not good enough. 
There is also this artificiality to the argument that I think continues 
to break down, because many shareholders want this stuff. Many 
shareholders want more environmental accountability, more labor 
friendliness, labor protection, economic equality, diversity—they are 
concerned about these issues too. So shareholder primacy is not exactly 
the same thing as maximized returns. 
There are so many different pieces moving here, but ultimately,  
I think we need to know much more even if we can see that there is a 
little bit less managerial accountability, which I am skeptical of anyway. 
If it advances these other metrics, then I think we might benefit from it. 
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Finally, the last point here really is there is so much inside the 
system as it currently exists to keep shareholder interests on the table. 
The quarterly reporting, the leak tables and performance and so forth, 
the idea that shareholder interests go out the window and managers can 
do whatever they want. Again, I just think it is possibly a real concern, 
but I think it is overstated. 
MS. LU: Adding to what Lisa and David mentioned, the 
importance of stakeholder capitalism is also about empowering the 
board to act in the long term interests of the company and about creating 
a company that is primed for sustainable long term growth, as opposed 
to being focused on short term growth and high stock prices in the short 
term, which may serve the interests of a select number of shareholders 
but may not actually serve the larger company, especially in the long 
run. For example, if a company could easily continue to do well in the 
short term without taking into account the risks relating to climate 
change; or takes seriously its human capital policies but fails to invest in 
research, development, and innovation; or fails to invest in the 
workforce, it will not be sustainable over the long term. 
If you are not capturing all the ESG risks and considering the 
concerns of your community, your suppliers, and your customers, you 
are not able to build a sustainable business. That is where stakeholder 
governance comes in, because it allows the board to take into account 
these issues and take a stance against short-termist thinking without 
risking punishment. That is what is really important here. I would 
counter the Bebchuk argument about less accountability. You would 
have less accountability by solely focusing on share prices because that 
does not account for how a company is going to perform over the 
medium to long run, which is what most people who are invested in 
companies care about. Most people are not flipping stocks, they are 
investing their life savings with a 10, 20, or 30-year horizon. 
TAYLOR WELLS: Shifting the conversation a little bit to 
millennial involvement in ESG, I want to ask the classic question: 
Today’s fight for ESG appears to pit young versus old, for example, 
millennials fighting to address climate change facing off against the 
large shareholder base of pension and retirement funds. How should the 
timeless problem of young versus old—here, stakeholders versus 
shareholders—be approached today? 
MR. WEBBER: First of all, I should just say that those types of 
conflicts are, I think, overstated. In my opinion, it is not really true that 
baby boomers are saying to themselves, “Let the planet burn, I don’t 
have much time left anyway.” I do not think that this is really the baby 
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boomer attitude, and in any case, those types of conflicts have always 
existed within every single pension fund and every single investment 
fund. 
If you look at every pension fund, if it makes an investment that 
pays off in 10 years, or two years, or 20 years, it is going to benefit 
some workers at the expense of others. There is this so-called duty of 
impartiality that is implied. I am talking about on the investment side, 
not necessarily the corporate side. This duty of impartiality really is not 
that muscular because of precisely the concerns just identified, unless 
you truly are favoring one set of beneficiaries over another. You are not 
really running afoul of the duty of impartiality. 
I will plug a paper that I have forthcoming with Michal Barzuza 
and Quinn Curtis, both of the University of Virginia.30 We talk about the 
rise of the millennials, in particular, to state the theory or hypothesis of 
the paper: why ESG? Why is it suddenly becoming so important now? 
Why has it moved from something that was once marginal, into 
something that is core? In particular, we focus on the big three index 
funds in that paper.31 We ask, why have they suddenly become more 
active voting in favor of environmental proposals and voting? Why have 
they started targeting board diversity and issues like that? 
Our hypothesis is that it really is about the fight to manage 
millennial money. It is about the fight to manage millennial investment 
dollars.32 These entities do not compete on what they invest in. The 
index funds all buy exactly the same thing. Their costs have essentially 
been whittled down to zero. What do they compete on? What is left to 
compete over assets under management? 
Carmen alluded to this earlier, but there is a lot of social science 
research that shows that the millennials have very different attitudes 
from baby boomers and Gen X along two dimensions. One is their 
actual political views and political attitudes. Millennials’ view on the 
environment and social issues are just different in many respects from 
Gen X and the baby boomers. The second, and I think even more 
consequential attitudinal difference, is that millennials say again and 
again—and there is a lot of anecdotal evidence to support that they mean 
 
 30. See generally Michal Barzuza et. al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG 
Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 
(2020). 
 31. See id. at 1253. 
 32. See id. at 1303, 1320. 
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it—that they are much more comfortable living their politics, not just in 
the voting booth, but at the office, in the way they shop, and in the 
investment choices that they make. I think we are seeing that. I think 
that we are seeing in terms of them saying that it is important to them to 
work at a company that they believe is doing sustainable, socially useful 
work. It is important to them to buy products like that, and it is 
important to them to invest accordingly. 
Part of our theory is that part of the reason that these investment 
managers are talking the ESG talk, and to some extent walking that walk 
as well, is over the efforts to appeal to millennials who now are 
predicted to be three quarters of the workforce by 2030, and who are 
now really making investment choices that tend to be kind of sticky.33  
If you invest in that 401(k) with one entity in your 20s, there is a decent 
chance that you will still be with them for years and years, whereas the 
boomers are already in, the Gen X people are already in. So I think that 
is what is driving a lot of why ESG is taking center stage now. 
MS. FAIRFAX: David is absolutely right. All the evidence is 
showing us a lot about this generation. How are they willing to spend 
their money? What they are willing to spend their money on? The fact 
that they are willing to put their dollars in businesses and in products if 
they think it reflects their values; how reputation matters. 
I too am resisting, as is David, this notion of us versus them. 
Rather, this is the evolution of a changing world and a changing 
economy. A changing understanding of what the long term means has 
got to happen when you have a generation that grew up with 
expectations that other generations did not have. This is a generation 
that grew up with expectations around concern for the environment. 
This is a generation that grew up with expectations about diversity, real 
or imagined, signaling or not. The truth is this generation has an 
expectation of what their workforce is supposed to look like, has an 
expectation about what those practices are supposed to reflect, and  
a generation that has proven that they will put their dollars where those 
expectations are. That is the key. 
They have said in their consumer spending patterns, in their 
investment patterns, even in their kind of choice of work patterns that it 
matters so much to us that this is where we are going to put our 
resources, and you have to be cognizant of that as you think about the 
 
 33. See, e.g., Clemens Sialm, Laura T. Starks & Hanjiang Zhang, Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?, 70 J. FIN. 805, 806–07 
(2015). 
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long term and what it means for that generation to have control of 
significant assets and resources for the next 30 or 40 years. 
MS. LU: If we also look at the demographics of millennials today, 
it is really different from previous generations. Millennials today are one 
of the most educated generations, so they are incredibly sophisticated 
and understand the investment propositions that have been put in front 
of them. They realize that it is a financial imperative, not just a moral 
imperative, to think about climate change or questions about diversity 
and inclusion, because all these things, ultimately, will likely have a real 
bottom line impact on the value of investments over a long horizon. 
Millennials today are also incredibly diverse, far more diverse than 
prior generations. Women hold much more wealth than prior 
generations, so that is where diversity and inclusion becomes a real 
issue, because the millennials entering the workforce are realizing that 
the issues of the past remain today. They are asking questions about 
what can be done to change institutions, and many of them are using 
their investments to push for change. I think we are at the initial phase 
of a wave of change because the generation behind the Millennials is 
just starting to enter the workforce and they are even more educated and 
even more diverse. 
MS. FAIRFAX: I would also add that this understanding of the 
impact of ESG targets on investments and on returns is something we 
have to unpack. I think one of the latest studies I saw was a meta-
analysis of many studies, going back over a decade, from the 
Department of Labor (DOL).34 It found that most people believe that if 
they invest with an ESG focus, they are going to have to sacrifice some 
profits.35 The empirical evidence does not bear that out: most of the 
empirical evidence supports the proposition that investing with those 
types of goals and targets will have you, at the very least, on the same 
level as conventional investing, if not better. 
I think the first panel said this—we have got to pull the ESG out. 
This is investing with these types of things in mind, and in fact, the 
evidence points to the fact that it is an investment that will give you  
 
 34. See generally DEP’T OF LAB., ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE 
(ESG) INVESTMENT TOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FIELD 14 (Dec. 2017), 
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 35. Id. 
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a good return. So that is something that people need to be mindful of as 
well. 
MS. LU: ESG funds have actually performed quite well during the 
pandemic, and have in many instances outperformed the market.36 The 
fact that ESG funds have proven themselves to be able to withstand 
severe market shocks is further evidence that taking this approach to 
investing is going to serve investors well, or at the very least, put them 
in the same position in most cases. 
MR. WEBBER: You can also look at it in the negative, as not only 
in terms of affirmative investments in growing sustainable industries, 
but also avoiding industries that do not fit those criteria. Following the 
logic of the millennial argument here, we can look at companies that 
were badly hit when they handled these kinds of issues in a bad way. 
Whether it is Starbucks coming out and banning its employees from 
wearing Black Lives Matter pins, then turning around and not only 
reversing itself after an outcry, but buying 250,000 Black Lives Matter 
T-shirts, and distributing them to their workers; 37 or that episode at Papa 
John’s38—this conduct had a serious negative impact on each company. 
Sometimes ESG is depicted as painting a rosy picture of investing in the 
right stuff, but it is also about avoiding the harm that is caused when you 
really alienate your employees, your customers, or your shareholders. If 
you alienate your employees or your customers, it can have effects on 
your share price. 
Again, it just underscores the point that the siloed way of looking at 
these things is inadequate—particularly when you have a rising 
generation that does not silo its politics into the voting booth alone—and 
decisionmakers have to take the ESG side into account here alongside 
the legal side and the corporate side of these issues, too. 
 
 36. Esther Whieldon & Robert Clark, ESG Funds Beat Out S&P 500 in 1st Year of 
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TAYLOR WELLS: Regarding millennials’ investment and ESG, 
research has shown the millennials are the first generation that are 
projected to be generally less wealthy than their predecessors. How will 
this affect millennials’ ability to implement long-lasting ESG values in 
mainstream corporate culture? 
MR. WEBBER: I think not that much, because even if that is true, 
per capita, that is not true in terms of the overall size of this generation. 
It is a much bigger generation than my own gen, Gen X, as Larry Fink 
recently pointed out.39 The millennials are on the threshold of inheriting 
somewhere from $12 trillion to as much as $30 trillion.40 It is the largest 
intergenerational asset transfer in the history of the world, and 
collectively, that generation is going to be massively powerful.41  
As I said, 75% of the workforce by 2030,42 with huge inheritances and 
wielding lots of market power, lots of consumer power. 
So I am not sure. I am always a little bit skeptical about those types 
of projections, but I think even if it is true, on a per capita level, it is not 
true in the aggregate. I think that they are not going to be thwarted for 
that reason. There may be other reasons, but not that one. 
MS. LU: Going off what David mentioned, I think we will hear in 
the press and the news about the struggles of millennials in terms of 
their ability to acquire wealth. I think, in many ways, the experience has 
also made millennials perhaps more aware and more concerned about 
ESG issues. Millennials have experienced significant challenges, such as 
mounting student debt challenges, two major recessions, and the 
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accompanying career setbacks. All these experiences do fold into how 
they make investment decisions. As David mentioned, it is probably 
going to impact the overall trend and push towards ESG in the longer 
run. 
MARIE BOGENEZ: I want to discuss the most recent proposed 
rule from the Department of Labor.43 It seems from the rule that it would 
discourage managers of ERISA covered pension plans from actually 
considering ESG issues when making their investments. What do you 
think will be the long term impact of that rule, if it were to be 
implemented? 
MR. WEBBER: It depends how long-term we are talking about 
here. My own view is that it will not. If it is implemented it will not 
linger for very long. It may not be implemented or may not even be 
implemented for very long, depending on the outcome of the election in 
a couple weeks. 
In my own view and those of my co-authors on that piece—because 
we think that this is so important to millennials, we think that market 
pressures in favor of ESG will continue to be enormous, and we think 
that ultimately the DOL’s ability to really constrain this kind of activity 
is going to be limited. It would be limited even if the current 
administration stays in business for another four years. If it does not,  
it will be more than just limited, it may just be eliminated and may never 
fully be implemented. 
It is interesting to note, if you look at the many comment letters 
objecting to this new ESG standard, that the objections do not come 
from the Bernie Sanders crowd. They are coming from very, very 
mainstream investment managers who are opposed to this. DOL has 
started essentially trying to harass some investment managers by 
demanding all sorts of documentation in wanting to see why they made 
certain decisions along ESG lines and so forth, and that is a real cost and 
also a little bit alarming to folks who have been targeted by it.44 
I suppose we should tell the political backstory, which is that the 
energy industry went to the Trump White House and complained about 
all this ESG stuff, shareholder proposals and so forth. The White House 
issued an executive order to the DOL to look into this fiduciary stuff, 
and that is why we got a flurry of this action from DOL over the 
summer. There are a lot of other investors out there other than those 
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governed by ERISA, including all the public pension plans. So given the 
market pressures in this direction, given the demand from customers, 
employees, investors, and millennials, I do not expect this to be the 
death knell of ESG that I think some of the folks who implemented this 
guidance hope it will be, but time will tell. 
MS. FAIRFAX: It is particularly concerning because it is based on 
a false premise that we have all been highlighting, which is the 
assumption that considerations around ESG do not align with or advance 
financial goals. The reason that you are getting at, David, suggests that 
these traditional funds and fund managers are pushing against  
a restriction like this is because it absolutely has an impact on financial 
goals. So, it is concerning to say these funds could not take that into 
account, recognizing that market pressure translates into money, into 
finances, into performance. The DOL’s own study just three years ago 
said when you look at the meta-analysis of all of the studies around ESG 
investing, they show that type of investing either performs as well as or 
outperforms conventional investments.45 So what are they doing right 
now? 
It is good of David to tell the political story behind the story, but 
certainly the question of what type of impact we expect it to have—if it 
remains in the long term, I think it could have a concerning impact. I do 
recognize that, in fact, there is some financial hit that you will take if 
you are not allowed to engage around these issues. 
As Carmen was suggesting, at this moment we are seeing these 
funds outperform the market, and researchers and analysts are saying it 
is because funds that invest and consider in this way are a proxy for 
resiliency. Sustainability is a proxy for resilience, it is a proxy for being 
able to weather the storm because you have taken into account some 
really important risk factors that other companies may have blind spots 
around. I think that whatever happens in November, the market will 
speak for itself around whether or not this makes sense. I think, 
ultimately, the market will demand the ability to continue to invest in 
the way that is most beneficial and the evidence suggests an inclusion of 
these types of factors. 
MS. LU: Quickly adding to what Lisa and David just said, I think 
there are still folks out there who do not believe that ESG has a positive 
impact, or at least a neutral impact on investment outcomes. I think that 
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group is getting smaller and smaller over time, and if we look at the 
trends right now, the influx of money into ESG funds is far greater than 
investments into regular funds. As long as this trend continues to persist, 
as Lisa mentioned, the market will speak for itself. There will ultimately 
be market demand for access to ESG-managed funds, and so I think it is 
really a question of time. As long as ESG continues to outperform and 
do well, then I think that the data itself will become irrefutable. 
AJ HARRIS: Over these last fifteen minutes, we would like to 
address some questions posed by the audience. The first question is: Are 
employee resource groups effective for promoting D&I, and if not, what 
can be done to make them more effective outlets within these firms? 
MS. FAIRFAX: Certainly, all of the studies around the D&I work 
at companies suggest that it is a top to bottom, bottom to top endeavor, 
and that you need to have buy-in from everybody and intentionality 
around all of the things that you do to both kind of recognize the places 
where there may be inequities as a result of race and to counteract those 
inequities. So I think it depends. I will end with what I started with:  
it depends. 
What is the makeup of the group? What is their charge? What we 
sometimes see with the groups that are tasked with D&I efforts is that 
companies tend to put the least powerful of the employees, with the 
vaguest of charges and the least amount of resources, and tell them to try 
to fix the problem that permeates the entire institution. Turns out, that is 
not going to work. But if you have a group of people who are dedicated 
to getting something done, who have the power and the resources to get 
it done, and who are willing to have difficult conversations to make 
difficult decisions, then yes, it could matter. 
AJ HARRIS: Another question is whether an increased emphasis 
on diversity is potentially a way of maximizing the value for 
shareholders because diversity reduces support for taxes and social 
spending and may make it more difficult for workers to organize. 
MR. WEBBER: There is a long chain of reasoning in that question 
that I am not sure I embrace, so I am not quite sure how to answer that.  
I mean, what do you mean by worker organizing—is it investors, or do 
you mean unions? 
AJ HARRIS: I think what the audience member is asking, in the 
bigger picture, is: If the efforts to increase diversity at a firm are 
successful, you have less political pressure on other firms to make these 
changes, and as a result, you may face less political pressure for taxes.  
If you have greater diversity efforts, you have a happier workforce, and 
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with a happier workforce, you face less push back for, let us say, union 
effort. 
MR. WEBBER: I see. There is a familiar argument that gets made 
in this space all the time, which is if you take your environmental issues, 
you take diversity. If you take any of these issues into the marketplace, 
into the corporation, does this incentivize making the changes in 
Washington or legislatively? Is there a sort of zero sum game? No.  
If you are directing your resources into one space, that does not mean 
you are not directing it somewhere else. It is related to a book I wrote.46 
I am not sure it focused so much on the diversity piece, but rather on 
how many resources a union, for example, should put into shareholder 
activism, versus into recruiting new unionized workers, versus into 
electoral politics. Institutions have to make these choices with scarce 
resources from my own perspective. 
I think that in the world that we are living in, in the 21st century, 
nobody can get away. No matter what issue you care about, you just 
cannot ignore what is going on in the marketplace. It is just not enough. 
There is too much power and influence in the private sector to ignore. 
Some of it is a story about gridlock in Washington. Some of it is just a 
story of capacity. It is just not enough anymore, in my view, to focus on 
legislative strategies alone, or on litigation strategies alone, or on 
regulatory strategies alone. Particularly in a world where markets 
operate globally and government regulation is still local—it is a serious 
asymmetry. And given the fact that markets operate globally as well, 
investors can also operate globally in a way that the sort of traditional 
tools of legislation or regulation do not. So I just do not see how you can 
ignore this space. 
If you care about the facts on the ground and almost anything 
happening in the real world, you cannot ignore this space. Whether and 
to what extent your efforts in one space may undermine or detract from 
your efforts is a complicated question. It is a fair question, but I think, 
no matter how you come out on that one, you cannot ignore the space, 
you just cannot. 
MS. FAIRFAX: I would just add one follow-up on that, to the 
extent I understand the question. There is a reason why the Black Lives 
Matter movement turned from a movement that was about protesting 
and people in the streets, that focused on the criminal justice system, 
 
 46. See generally DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS 
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (Harv. Univ. Press 2018). 
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towards pressuring the corporation and issues like that. There is  
a connectedness there. So David is right, these things intersect and 
people are sophisticated enough to understand the intersection. It cannot 
be viewed as a zero sum game. It is not an “either-or”; it is a “both-and.” 
MS. LU: Going off briefly from what David and Lisa just said,  
I think if you look at the most recent Business Roundtable statement, 
what was interesting was that when they were talking about promoting 
racial equity and reducing justice, they also mentioned that aside from 
the private sector initiatives, they also talked about lobbying the 
government and proposing public policy proposals. I think that  
is interesting because it is an implicit recognition by the private sector 
that they have tremendous political influence. I think change in the 
private sector is particularly important, and I think any political changes 
will likely require cooperation from the private sector. 
AJ HARRIS: I would close by asking for your future projections 
for the space in the next five years or so. What are some reasonable 
goals, and what are the realistic odds of their success in the foreseeable 
future? 
MS. LU: I think the biggest challenge right now is creating an 
effective disclosure system for corporations so that there is a baseline 
from which people can understand how ESG is being dealt with, how 
risks and opportunities are being managed, and how to differentiate 
companies. I think we will see a lot of movement in the next couple of 
months because we are seeing a lot of push in the private sector for a 
coherent disclosure framework, and that in turn will likely trigger, 
hopefully, more effective disclosures from companies. 
Also, to recognize companies that are outperforming their peers.  
I think that will be one of those critical goals. I think looking further 
afield, it is hard to predict where this is going to go, but if we look at 
recent trends in terms of investing and the scope and scale and 
investment in ESG, it has grown exponentially. It has not just been  
a steady increase, it has really dramatically exploded in the last couple 
months. I think if this trend continues, all the debate and old debate and 
skepticism may slowly erode, and what you will really see is a greater 
focus on how we deal with these issues. How do we calibrate risks and 
opportunities? How do we determine the best governance practices? 
Companies are looking to address this, both on the board level and also 
throughout management, because addressing ESG is not simply about 
what is happening at the top. It is also about how that gets filtered down 
all through the bottom, and this is particularly the case with issues such 
as D&I. 
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MR. WEBBER: I will focus quickly just on the “S.” I hope we are 
going to see it—it has been talked about forever. I hope we are going to 
do more for workers in this country and I hope we are going to see some 
serious infrastructure spending that could potentially put millions of 
people back to work or secure their current jobs, resulting also in 
payments into retirement funds and having all sorts of salutary effects.  
I think that if such an infrastructure investment plan does come down,  
it is not going to be just in the form of a big check from the government; 
hopefully, there will be a significant check from the government, but  
a lot of it is going to come from the private sector and from tax 
incentives that might be created in such a plan to make such 
investments. 
One very positive way we might see some of the “S” in action 
would be for pension funds and investment funds to use their power and 
make these infrastructure investments to ensure that workers are getting 
a good, fair bargain with respect to prevailing wages and benefits when 
they work on such projects. That has been shown to be profitable. It has 
been shown to create returns, and I also think it would be good for a lot 
of people in this country who need it. 
MS. FAIRFAX: I agree with both of those comments, in particular 
the focus on the workers, because I think human capital management is 
a very important and live issue. I am hopeful that we will make some 
headway on that. I think it is likely to be in fits and starts. I think 
disclosure is the same way, not only better and more meaningful 
disclosure, but some standardization. That is going to be the most 
helpful piece of the disclosure, and I expect fits and starts there too. 
We will get to a place after finding some convergence around what 
people feel are best practices that the SEC will pick up from. I imagine, 
there will be regulation in this space, but probably not until there is 
some significant agreement around best practices. 
The last thing I will say is the goal with regard to ESG target 
metrics is to obtain credible commitments. You have to move from the 
rhetoric to the credible commitment. If you do not measure it, it does not 
matter. So we need to be thinking about what credible commitments 
look like in this space. Is it tied to executive compensation? Is it realistic 
targets and goals? What is it? This is the second wave of that push. How 
do we hold feet to the fire and make companies have credible 




DIANNA LAM: Welcome back everyone. We are very excited that 
Former Chief Justice Strine, one of the foremost authorities on Delaware 
law and a leading voice in ESG, has agreed to serve as our keynote 
speaker. Although he needs no introduction, please allow me to remind 
you of a few of his many, many, many accomplishments. 
Chief Justice Strine served on the Delaware Supreme Court from 
2014 until 2019 after previously serving as Vice Chancellor and then 
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. He has written hundreds 
of opinions in the area of corporate law and contract law, trusts and 
estates, criminal, administrative, and constitutional law. His opinions are 
among the most influential in Delaware, and particularly in the area of 
corporate law everywhere. The Chief Justice holds long standing 
teaching positions at Harvard Law and the Penn Carey School of Law, 
and he also holds distinguished fellowships at both of these law schools 
and Columbia Law. He is a member of the American Law Institute 
where he served as an advisor on the project to create a restatement of 
corporate law. From 2006 to 2019 he served as the special judicial 
consultant to the ABA Committee on corporate law. He also was the 
special judicial consultant to the ABA Committee on mergers and 
acquisitions from 2014 to 2019. Among his many awards, in 2000, 
Governor Carper awarded Chief Justice Strine the Order of the First 
State. In 2002, President David Roselle of the University of Delaware 
presented him with the University’s citation for Outstanding 
Achievement. In 2006, he was selected as a Henry Crown Fellow at the 
Aspen Institute. In 2019, he was awarded an honorary degree from 
Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland. 
We are honored that among his many speaking engagements, he 
has chosen to serve as our keynote speaker. I will now turn it over to 
Professor Sean Griffith. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Dianna. Chief Justice, welcome. 
HON. STRINE: It is great to be with you Sean. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: It is a pleasure to have you here. Well, virtually 
here. 
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HON. STRINE: So, it’s virtual happy hour and I expect everybody 
on the phone to feel free to drink. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: We are all virtually happy already. Chief 
Justice, I’d like to talk about some of the recent work that you have been 
doing, and the big picture policy proposals that you have been writing 
about and thinking about since leaving the bench. 
My first question for you is to remark on the scope and scale of the 
thinking that you have been doing since you left the bench. These ideas 
that you have been coming up with, and the papers that you put out this 
summer, can really be seen as large-scale reforms of the way that 
capitalism might work in the United States. They are much broader in 
scope, as I said, than even the most wide-ranging judicial opinion.  
So, I would like to invite you to talk a bit about the things that you are 
thinking about now and how they may or may not connect to the kind of 
thinking that you did as a foremost jurist on the foremost corporate law 
bench. 
HON. STRINE: Sean, I’m really glad you actually ask this question 
because there’s nothing really new about my focus. When I was on the 
bench, for example, I wrote an article and I gave a lecture on these 
larger topics in 2006. I talked about how my hairline was a tribute to my 
first political hero who was running for president then. That was then-
Senator Biden who was running in the primaries in the 2006–07 cycle 
running up to 2008. That article was called the Shared Interest of 
Corporate Managers and Workers in Corporate Governance Reform.1  
It actually turned into a symposium and people like my friend Damon 
Silvers, who is head of policy at the AFL-CIO, and Jack Bogle 
responded.2 They address many of the themes that my recent work does. 
I’ve written widely throughout the century on the need to rebalance our 
corporate governance system. I think it’s telling, though, that the work 
has gotten more attention recently. It’s not because I’m saying anything 
particularly new—it’s because what has been happening in our 
economic and corporate governance systems does not work and has 
created economic insecurity and inequality, and that’s finally getting the 
attention it deserves. 
 
 1. Symposium, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007). 
 2. Id. 
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It has long been a concern of mine that what the “is” is about our 
corporate governance system is a long way from the “ought,” and in 
terms of my work as a judge, it is easy to see, given where I was sitting 
in Delaware, the pressures under which public company managers in 
particular are operating. The dynamics changed profoundly even during 
the 21 years I was on the bench, with growing and extraordinary 
pressures to deliver immediate returns to the market; the pressure to 
squeeze other stakeholders, if necessary, to do that. Some people have 
said, for example, “Well, the R&D is still kind of going strong.”  
R&D actually is often reduced in places where activists go, but what 
frequently happens is, if R&D is not cut, then worker’s pay is cut.  
And there is offshoring and downsizing. 
Look at what happened in terms of the lack of resiliency of 
companies in the face of the pandemic because they didn’t have the kind 
of reserves to even weather a month without laying off workers or 
stiffing their creditors. If you talk about the brittle supply chains—our 
prior panel, I agree wholeheartedly except, I would just say to my 
friends, David and Lisa, stop burying the workers in the “S” of ESG: 
Call it EESG. The workers deserve their own letter, and it’s not 
surprising they haven’t had their own letter because investors, frankly, 
haven’t cared that much about workers. It took really the 2016 election 
and things like Brexit for people to start understanding that the fabric of 
our nation has been torn and the social compact violated in a way that is 
not sustainable. That’s why the statements by the Business Roundtable 
(“BRT”)3 and people like Mr. Fink, which I support, both of those 
directions—those are symptoms of the real illness. They are not on the 
vanguard of history, they are responding to the realities of growing 
economic insecurity and inequality and its threats to our society, and 
their own businesses. 
The BRT and the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) are 
reacting belatedly to an imbalanced corporate governance structure that 
can be summarized in this simple way.4 Stockholder power: envision  
a big arrow going hugely up, and then stakeholders’ power, see another 
 
 3. See generally Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to 




 4. Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable’s Statement 
on Corporate Purpose, COUNCIL INST. INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/
aug19_brt_response [https://perma.cc/48K8-DV5T]. 
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arrow but going way down, particularly for workers. When that 
happens, it’s natural that more wealth flows to the group with power and 
comes out of the share of those who have lost power. 
For a long time, I have written about the need to rebalance this, to 
require institutional investors to align their interest with the interest of 
their worker investors whose capital they hold, to constrain businesses 
from polluting our economy and regulatory system and denuding the 
protections for stakeholders. My recent work is really just pulling that 
together. 
The larger piece about fair and sustainable capitalism came because 
a bunch of policymakers sort of said, “Leo, could you pull together all 
the different strands in one place?” So I tried to do that. But it’s really 
been a longstanding passion of mine. What I saw in the Court of 
Chancery and in the Supreme Court is the power dynamics that that put 
all the pressure on the operating companies and their fiduciaries to 
squeeze the lemon for the institutional investors who control them. 
These are the companies that make real products, they deliver real 
services and they employ people. We really don’t and won’t have shared 
accountability on the part of the institutional investor segment until we 
bring their responsibilities into alignment with the interests of their long-
term worker-investors, and, frankly, restore the promise of the New 
Deal and European social democracy. 
We’re going to have too many externalities, we’re going to treat 
workers poorly, we’re not going to confront things like climate change, 
and we’re going to be poorer for it because it does not foster sustainable 
economic growth for companies to compete on regulatory arbitrage and 
externalities, rather than on what the dimension should be: which is real 
innovation and quality. So, that’s some more context than maybe you 
want, but I’m pleased to see people finally talking about workers. 
As I said, however, it’s not coincidental that the workers are buried 
in the “S.” I would challenge anybody to look at sustainability 
conferences over the last 10 years. Until maybe the last year or two  
I didn’t even hear much of a mention of workers, living wages, or the 
fair treatment of them. It was all pretty much through an investor lens.  
I think it took the murder of Mr. Floyd for investors to finally focus on 
racial inequality. The institutional investors and folks on the 
sustainability front were doing some stuff around gender inequality, but 
you can question why they weren’t focusing on race until 2020, because 
the statistics were grimmer for Black people by far than for women.  
I have always supported doing something about both, and it’s good they 
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are finally taking that position too. They were not doing anything about 
wage inequality until some of the things I mentioned, and I hope they 
will do something now. 
I think when corporate America has taken another round of 
government bailouts—bailouts that have been hugely helpful to the 
money manager community by the way—and when we have seen that 
the essential worker class has been treated so poorly, I think we are at a 
moment where maybe we can rebalance things fundamentally. I have 
been hoping this moment would come a while back. I would applaud, 
for example, the people at the Aspen Business and Society program.  
If you look at their reports5—and I played a role in authoring them going 
back into the first decade of this century—they were talking about many 
of the same issues as the folks at B Lab.6 
As you know, our friends in corporate law academia are still 
obsessed with sell-side takeover premiums, and things like that. I don’t 
think we in corporate law have had a very wide lens as a community on 
the effect of corporations on society and the effect of institutions on how 
corporations behaved. I think it’s long overdue that there’s conferences 
like this, by distinguished institutions like Fordham that actually focus 
on things that matter to real people. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thank you. It seems to me, if I can characterize 
one of the big ideas that comes through in your recent work: it is to add 
that extra letter to the front or to take the employees out of the “S,” as 
you said, and so to make it about EESG and not just about ESG. That 
seems to me consistent, as you said, with some of the things that you 
have written about in the past. 
Is there anything different now? You mentioned in passing the 
Business Roundtable statement7 by the CEOs of the largest companies 
 
 5. See generally ASPEN INST., AMERICAN PROSPERITY PROJECT: A NONPARTISAN 
FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT (Dec. 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_
FINAL-1.3.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LNA-JNF2]; ASPEN INST., LONG TERM VALUE 
CREATION: PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (June 2007), 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/files/content/docs/bsp/
FinalPrinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL7K-4PDQ]. 
 6. See, e.g., B LAB & S’HOLDER COMMONS, FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO 




 7. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 3. 
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in America that we should stop focusing on shareholder wealth 
maximization as the most important thing for corporate law. We’ve 
heard things like that in the past, of course, when the debate about 
employees was often about manager-employee. Managers would 
squeeze employees in connection with takeovers, they would seek 
takeovers to maximize golden parachutes or something like this and 
employees would get the short end of the stick as you alluded to. Your 
suggestion now is that we’re in a different EESG space. I guess one of 
my questions is, do we really trust the Business Roundtable—this group 
of managers—to take care of employee issues, and if not, what’s 
different now? 
HON. STRINE: I have never thought that America should just trust 
the elite to do this. I was very appreciative of the Business Roundtable’s 
statement. I think it was quite useful. I would say that the Chair at the 
time, Mr. Dimon, runs a company that is basically Delaware’s largest 
private sector employer now. I must say, they pay very good wages to 
people at all levels of the company. They contribute to charities in the 
community and we’re very lucky to have them in Delaware. So it seems 
to be a company that on that dimension, in many ways, is walking the 
talk. But do I think that you leave it to business alone? No, and I 
certainly wouldn’t leave it to the institutional investors, either. I don’t 
actually think it was public company managers who wanted to squeeze 
labor the most. I think they were told by institutional investors, “You 
better d–mn well do that or you won’t have your job,” and their pay was 
tied to total stock return. The labor costs, an area where the institutional 
investor community and the stock analyst community puts really strong 
pressures on companies. What’s different now is that it’s not 
sustainable, people are not going to take it anymore. It’s causing racial 
and ethnic divisions because nativists are using the economic insecurity 
of white working people to divide us along lines about immigration and 
race. We are failing to close the race gap. 
In terms of creating investor pools to sustain pension funds or 
retirement funds, if people do not get paid fairly, they cannot save for 
retirement. It is also not true, and I think it is really important to 
understand this, that the wage stagnation cannot be blamed on the 
workforce itself. The American worker is more educated than ever, 
more adaptable than ever. It is total bull that there’s been some 
Darwinian evolution among money managers and CEOs in the last 50 
years, where they become immeasurably smarter and deserve more of 
the pie. Almost every profession has more education requirements than 
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it used to. It’s not just people who are working class who have been 
hit—skilled professionals have seen their wages stagnate. It’s not 
because there hasn’t been more productivity and growth, it’s because the 
share of productive growth that has been taken by the top is huge. They 
have eaten all the new pie, and we need to go back to where there is fair 
gain-sharing. I think you can’t just say “we got it now, we understand,” 
because the businesspeople who want to do it right—the institutional 
investors who want to do it right—will then be undercut. You need a 
level playing field and government must set that. 
Anybody who plays sports knows that if the referee doesn’t rule the 
game and enforce the rules, then at the end of the game, you’re up to the 
level of the most sportsmanlike competitors. The most sportsmanlike 
people are probably kicking people from behind in order to survive. So 
we need to restore a regulatory framework of fair stakeholder protection 
within which all companies compete, and in the institutional investor 
sector, we need to do the same so that they all have to focus. It is the 
opposite of what Secretary of Labor Scalia is doing. We need to go in 
the opposite direction and make sure that institutional investors actually 
have to align their voting and their stewardship with the real interest of 
human investors, which requires taking into account EESG.8 
On workers in particular, there is absolutely no question that we 
cannot go back to a fair economy unless we restore the real promise of 
minimum wage laws and set a floor under bargaining. If we do not 
restore worker leverage in the form of revitalizing the ability to really 
join a union and bargain, we will not get there. We need to also 
experiment with other forms of worker voice, another reason I believe 
some reform within corporate law is critical to make sure every large 
company, public or private, has a board committee focused on the well-
being and pay of the workforce as a whole, and not just top 
management. One of the real problems with just relying on external 
reform—if you look at the early part of the century, I was more inclined 
to say, let’s leave to external regulation the protection of all other 
stakeholders, and to say don’t pretend that corporate managers can 
balance all these things because you might weaken the force to get labor 
law reform or environmental reform done. But I realized that you 
couldn’t get where you needed without rebalancing within corporate law 
itself. The problem is Lewis Powell and Milton Friedman and the 
 
 8. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in 
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock 62–
63 (Columbia L. Ctr. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 637, 2020). 
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consequences of their thinking and its success: They told corporations to 
focus just on profits for stockholders and to go to war on the regulatory 
protections for other stakeholders, and that is what happened.9 
For 50 years, there’s been a use of corporate treasury funds and 
influence to actually pollute the regulatory framework in which 
corporations operate to systematically go after stakeholder protection, 
such as union rights and environmental protection. I am now convinced 
that if you do not deal with the power dynamics within corporate 
governance itself, in a binding way that you actually cannot get the kind 
of externality regulation that you want. Ideally, you do want labor law to 
protect workers, and you want environmental regulation to do it. You 
want corporate law to stick more to its own knitting, but if we have 
changed the corporate power dynamics—such that companies are under 
pressure to really deny climate change, to block environmental 
regulation, to block living wage legislation, to impede the ability to 
actually join a union, to undercut consumer laws, we basically destroyed 
the fuller conception of what antitrust was to do in our economy—then 
in order to rebalance that we actually have to temper corporate political 
influence and focus corporate governance on fairness to all stakeholders. 
There is a role for regulation there in that process as well. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: I want to get to your specific corporate 
governance ideas. Before we leave the big picture of employment 
question, I just had to follow-up on the remarks that you just made. You 
touched on “competition is global.” The question is—aren’t product 
markets global markets? Every time I turn on Bloomberg radio in the 
morning, they are talking about automation, how automation is the next 
thing, and how if you thought outsourcing was bad, wait until 
automation happens. Turning to jobs, there is no such thing as a job 
anymore, including for fancy law professors like myself. One question 
is, how can anyone deal with that if there is always an incentive for 
some other competitor in the product market who might not be . . . 
HON. STRINE: You are absolutely right, but here it is a question 
of how we deal with that. People forget that historically, the New Deal 
in many ways was the nationalization of our regulatory structure, 
 
 9. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782–83 (1978); see 
also Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine–The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/
09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html 
[https://perma.cc/632Q-UY7A]. 
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intended to keep up with an already nationalized economy. We already 
had commerce flowing across state lines. We had implications for our 
entire society, and we had no effective national regulatory structures to 
deal with them. 
In terms of international marks, it was Roosevelt’s vision and 
Churchill’s that the postwar trading blocs that were established would 
actually embed the core provisions of the New Deal in which the New 
Deal in many ways inspired European social democracy.10 Clement 
Attlee and other folks borrowed from the New Deal. The post-War 
trading regimes were supposed to embed protections, not just for 
mobilized capital, but for workers and the environment. Product market 
pressures actually have already grown enormously, which is why what 
we did in the United States to make companies much more focused 
solely on stockholders made no sense. What I mean by that is, this idea 
that companies were not as subject to market pressures as they should 
be, and that we had to make them much more responsive  
to stockholders, ignored the huge pressure that you mentioned from 
international competition. 
Part of one of my articles I wrote back in the early part of the 
century is about two “Friedmen”—about Milton Friedman, about Tom 
Friedman, and about the need to actually take the New Deal,11 to kind of 
knit it together OECD-wide, so that competition is not on the wrong 
dimensions and we don’t encourage labor arbitrage or tax havens, the 
inversion wave, but competition in a way that promotes virtuous cycles. 
Then in the developing world. We understand that what is a living 
wage may be different, but the same concept of a living wage, the same 
concept of safe worker conditions, the same concept of being able  
to join a union, the same concept of no child labor, that those things 
would be extended there. It is often implied that it is all globalization 
that has caused wage stagnation and increased inequality; that it’s not 
really about what is going on in the United States itself. 
The problem with that is the evidence is just to the contrary. 
Lawrence Mishel at EPI has done the real leading work on this and 
academics need to give him more credit. He has been the one shedding 
 
 10. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for This Moment: The Enduring 
Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 267 
(2019). 
 11. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the 
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, 58 
UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 241, 274 (2008). 
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the most light for the longest time on the change and gain sharing and 
the American economy.12 But Larry Summers and Professor [Anna] 
Stansbury—I don’t know if you’ve seen their piece this summer— 
but it isolates the U.S. effect, looking at globalization and looking at 
what matters.13 Their conclusion is that there’s much greater growth in 
inequality than in equality. So there’s more imbalance in the United 
States, there is more wealth disparity than in the OECD, and what 
explains it is those two arrows I talked about. The United States has 
been the place where stockholder power has gone up the most and where 
worker voice and leverage has gone down the most. It is that—and not 
globalization—which is the key; it is that change in the distributional 
split. It is what happens when companies in the United States are 
successful, what share goes to which constituency—that really is what is 
driving U.S. inequality. 
I would just make a point that Germany and Scandinavia have been 
pretty successful in the international product markets.14 Every rich 
person I know has all kinds of fancy products from these “horrible 
socialist economies” in Scandinavia and Germany. These “crappy 
economies” somehow make these precision goods, and continue to do so 
in the face of global competition, even though they have  
co-determination with workers’ councils from the ground up, workers 
on boards at the top, and stakeholder forms of corporate governance.  
So I don’t doubt that we need to globalize our approaches. What I think, 
however, that we have to globalize is the thing we’re proud of, and the 
thing we’re proud of is an approach to a market economy that defeated 
communism, defeated fascism, and showed that a market economy 
could work for the benefit of the many. What we have been doing  
is allowing ourselves to erode the protections and the things that mean 
the most to our societies by having a global trading regime that only 
 
 12. See generally Lawrence Mishel, Lynn Rhinehart & Lane Windham, Explaining 
the Erosion of Private-Sector Unions, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 18, 2020), 
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legal-
erosion [https://perma.cc/VXW8-5UUF]. 
 13. See generally Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining 
Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American 
Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27193/w27193.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WSR-9NKA]. 
 14. See Kathleen Thelen, Transitions to the Knowledge Economy in Germany, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, 51 COMPAR. POL. J. 295, 295–96 (2019). 
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really values mobilized capital, and that allows a nation like China, 
which is playing a mercantilist fascist game at best, to be a full 
participant and to put downward pressure on the ability of our societies 
to treat their stakeholders well. 
I think we have to be hugely international going forward, but the 
way we’d actually bring the United States much more into alignment 
with the OECD would be to move in the direction that I’m talking about, 
and folks like Professor Fairfax and Professor Webber are, because the 
United States is actually more of an outlier than it is consistent with the 
other market economies. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Let me shift our conversation, if you don’t 
mind, to some of your specific corporate governance reform ideas, in 
particular, to the reform idea around the compensation committee.15  
One of your recent papers suggests that one way to accomplish the kind 
of goals that you have just outlined would be through reconceiving the 
role of the compensation committee of the board.16 Of course, normally 
compensation committees are tasked with setting Chief Executive 
Officer and another high-ranking officer pay. Under your conception, 
they would do much more than that. In terms of figuring out a fair ratio 
of pay for employees. 
HON. STRINE: If you think about it—if you want the average 
worker to make more, then the best way to do it is to put American 
compensation committees on to that task. If there’s any group of people 
who knows how to increase the pay of some group of people, it’s them. 
Sean, I am joking, but not entirely. These people have been very good at 
increasing pay of a small segment of people and of boards of directors. 
So in terms of this, they know a lot about that. But yes, I do think that 
they should have a broader role. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Let me ask you about this. In your paper, you 
suggest that the board compensation committee needs to think not only 
about executive pay, but also about employee pay.17 And for companies 
that do outsourcing, then also the pay of the folks that are the inputs on 
the supply chain—if there’s an outsourced supply chain for a big 
company. This seems to me to be sort of a microcosm of the other 
 
 15. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality 
Workplace for Employees: How a Reconceived Compensation Committee Might Help 
Make Corporations More Responsible Employers and Restore Faith in American 
Capitalism, 76 BUS. LAW. 31, 31 (2020–21). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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constituencies’ stories that you were just outlining through the 
compensation committee. In other words, the directors who are on the 
compensation committee are no longer thinking primarily about 
shareholders, as you suggested previously, but also about other 
constituencies, at least in the sense of employees, and then maybe in the 
context of extended supply chains of the folks who are . . . 
HON. STRINE: Yes, although I would argue that they are also 
thinking better for stockholders because if you have an extra $5 million 
in compensation and you throw it at the C-suite, the top executives can 
feel better when the New York Times report about CEO pay comes out 
as they will rank higher. Or you can take those $5 million dollars and 
reward a much broader class of workers in a way that is very meaningful 
to them. What sort of productivity gains are you going to get out of that 
for the company itself and therefore for stockholders, and for overall 
economic growth? Seems likely to be greater. That sort of distribution is 
also more likely to create strong product and service markets that creates 
overall growth. I would actually say it is a much more rational way of 
doing business. 
I am saying that it also is a much more rational way to set top 
executive compensation, because you can better situate where you put 
your dollars in terms of where they will have the most impact. Sadly,  
I think many boards do not understand a lot about how they compensate 
their workers. I think they also don’t understand a lot about groups of 
people who are basically workers of the company, but through 
contractors. For example, my wife is an occupational therapist at a 
hospital. There’s been a group of people incredibly important to keeping 
Americans safe and protecting lives during the pandemic: the people 
who clean hospitals. Think about the people who have gone to work 
every day during the pandemic. The people who clean the offices and 
the buildings. Many of them do not work for the company that they 
clean. They’re there in that facility every day. What do they get paid? 
What does it mean for a company to have a commitment to living wages 
if they have thousands of people who are essentially fundamental parts 
of their supply chain on a regular basis who don’t get it? So, I think if 
we actually want to create the right framework, the board itself has to be 
involved. 
I also think there are important issues like racial and gender pay 
equity that get no board level attention. When you have a group of the 
board that’s focused on compensation, why aren’t they taking a broader 
human resources lens on this? Why aren’t they looking at things like 
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#MeToo? In 2019, MeToo was important. Just because 2020 has been 
so sad and weird doesn’t mean MeToo is not important. It’s really 
important that you have a harassment free workplace on all kinds of 
dimensions. Instead of finding out that there’s a problem when there’s a 
crisis, instead of having situations where people who do the important 
work of human resources, anti-discrimination in companies never 
having a board committee that they have any regular access to, and 
instead of companies talking about racial equity and inclusion and 
talking about doing something about workers—how about having  
a structure that actually supports and does something meaningful about 
that? 
Frankly, we have too many companies right now where the 
compensation committee does all the compensation for the C-suite, does 
all the compensation for the board, and then all the human resources 
compliance issues go to the audit committee which has huge other tasks 
to do, and is not necessarily skilled in any of these areas. There’s no 
ability for the human resources people to get an adequate amount of 
time because of the hard work that the audit committee has to do in its 
core area. 
This is a broader thing that we’re going to talk about—we’re not 
using the board in a very business-like way to address how companies 
affect society, where legal bite comes in because the company rubs up 
against society and its stakeholders in certain ways, and to align the 
corporate board and management reporting structures in a sensible way 
and then come up with public metrics and other ways of measuring 
progress that allow the board to set goals and also to communicate to the 
public what companies are trying to do, for them to be held accountable, 
and to get credit. It’s striking to me how little I think many boards 
actually understand about their overall pay plan. I don’t want them to 
get in the weeds. I don’t want them to set individuals’ pay. 
But I do think it’s their responsibility to have a perspective on 
important things like, “Are we committed to a living wage?” Look at 
quartiles of who gets paid and then what categories of employees they 
cover and if that is fair? How do we treat our contractors? And I will 
also say this: the “U” word and boards—why is it that that’s not being 
discussed there? What is our attitude towards unionization? Do we have 
a board philosophy about that? Do we crush our American workers if 
they try to unionize, while we accept unions in Scandinavia and 
Germany because we know we have to? Those kinds of conversations 
could be very helpful to go along with external constraints. To go back  
a little bit, I think sectoral bargaining, for example, which Vice 
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President Biden is recommending—that is also a tool that is used in 
many market economies to reduce arbitrage against workers and 
encourage competition on productivity and quality grounds. That is 
something that could help businesses trying to do it right. So, I think this 
is something that companies could do on their own, that would be very 
business-like, and put them in a good position to address some of the 
demands that people like Lisa Fairfax talked about for companies to 
disclose in this area. It would enable companies to not just discuss 
something like a MeToo problem for the first time when it’s on the front 
page of the newspaper, but to actually be involved in making sure the 
companies have really good policies that they actually walk the talk in 
these areas. So that’s my idea. 
I actually drew on the new movement in the UK that requires 
something similar in terms of board level focus on these issues.18 It also 
could be a way, if we get some experience and trust with this, where 
American companies could experiment in a way that the labor 
movement would support with forms of worker voice at companies that 
are non-union companies. Almost like experimenting with works 
councils. Because if you had a part of the board that was actually 
charged with doing this fairly, it might be that the union movement 
would trust that a little bit. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Well, it is interesting. It is very interesting.  
In your remarks, you mentioned that paying workers better might 
actually increase the productivity and the value of the product as well. 
That reminded me of the old Dodge v. Ford case where Henry Ford is 
on trial for being a traitor to his class for paying his workers $5 a week 
instead of $2.50, and the obvious reason that he is doing that is to get a 
sober regular workforce, so that he can run his assembly line.19 And so, 
it seems like the way to increase productivity and profit potentially . . . 
HON. STRINE: Well, right, and that’s why companies like Google 
serve—if you have ever been lucky enough to go the Google cafeteria 
for lunch or dinner, Taco Tuesday is pretty spectacular there, Thai 
 
 18. Id. at 42–43. 
 19. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (1919) (“My ambition, said Mr. 
Ford, is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this 
we are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Lee Schafer, Ford Case Defined Role of Business, STAR 
TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/schafer-ford-case-defined-role-
of-business/491505831 [https://perma.cc/Y7MC-CEAQ]. 
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Thursday, the Coq Au Vin—I mean, they have got really great health 
and food facilities. They’re doing that, in part, because it inspires 
people. Henry Ford had maybe less savory motives, as we both know.  
I mean, well, he made those jobs horrible. People who were used to 
complex jobs on farms. I mean, being a farmer was hard work, but it 
was really interesting. Very diverse things farmers do, as you know, and 
then you are on an assembly line. So, if you don’t pay those people well, 
they quit. Ford’s problem in that case against the Dodge brothers is that 
he confessed and claimed he only raised wages to help workers and 
society.20 He didn’t really fess up that it was all also great for 
stockholders to do that because he was branding and enhancing his and 
his company’s reputation. I mean, he also wanted to sell products and a 
lot more of them, and higher wages in society created more consumers 
for his cars. 
This is another thing, consumers like to feel good about companies 
they buy products and services from. My other basic point is—just  
a distributional point—that if you have a certain pool of money that you 
are going to give out in compensation, how you allocate it could have a 
different effect on productivity as well. Giving extra millions to 
somebody who is not going to spend it, who already has more than 
plenty; as opposed to giving it to people for whom it really matters, and 
where they feel valued, and where you can help 50 to 100 to 1000 
people. I often tell directors to remember that another million dollars for 
the C-Suite is a thousand $1,000 bonus checks that just appear at the 
beginning of June and everybody says, “We know this maybe can’t fund 
your entire vacation, but we hope it helps you or your family in some 
meaningful way.” 
How much pep does that put in the step of 1000 people? What if 
you take it to $5 million? We haven’t really thought about that, and I do 
not think that it will be so negative for the stockholders we really care 
about—who are the diversified investors, who are “long” investors and 
depend on our whole economy’s growth, not that of any particular 
company. I actually think—you mentioned a bit about CEOs and things 
like that—I think a lot of CEOs would rather feel good that they are 
treating the people that come to work with them every day well, and 
there is a lot of investor pressure on them now not to do that. 
I also think while we are talking about EESG, I feel—and I have 
felt strongly for a long time—that boards just are not allocating their 
responsibilities in a businesslike way, they are still sticking everything 
 
 20. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919). 
354 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
they do into the audit committee. In a couple recent cases in Chancery, 
companies really get caught out.21 One got the case dismissed, but the 
CEO got fired over the scandal.22 The other one, the case is going to full 
discovery.23 
People like Dr. Fauci can’t even serve on the compliance 
committee of many food and pharma companies. Do you know why? 
Because he probably would say, I’m not really an accounting expert and 
if I have to serve on the audit compliance committee, that is not real 
comfortable for me. But we don’t care if we have a former high-level 
KPMG accountant or a CFO dealing with environmental risk or product 
safety risk or pharmaceutical risk or human resource risk that is really 
alien to them and in which they have no expertise. We don’t care that 
we’re having a line to the audit committee and key professionals in the 
environmental product, safety, and human resources spaces who have no 
regular time with the board. It’s just long overdue to fix this, and it’s 
really sensible for companies to identify what the risks are. 
How you affect society is going to line up with where you have 
legal risks because of how legal risk comes in—the law regulates 
companies where they affect society. That is where you have 
stakeholder concerns. The “E,” called environmental, should not be in 
two different places in your company. You shouldn’t rotely stick the  
 
 21. Nicholas D. Mozal & David A. Seal, Three Is Not a Trend: Another Caremark 
Claim Survives a Motion to Dismiss, But Does Not Reflect Change in the Law, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
05/27/three-is-not-a-trend-another-caremark-claim-survives-a-motion-to-dismiss-but-
does-not-reflect-a-change-in-the-law [https://perma.cc/32S8-TDEM]; Kevin LaCroix, 
Another Delaware Breach of the Duty of Oversight Case Survives Dismissal Motion, 
D&O DIARY (May 5, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/05/articles/director-
and-officer-liability/another-delaware-breach-of-the-duty-of-oversight-case-survives-
dismissal-motion [https://perma.cc/DB5H-MU69]. 
 22. See Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Judge Refuses to Toss McDonald’s Lawsuit Seeking 
to Clawback More Than $37 Million From Fired CEO Steve Easterbrook, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-mcdonalds-
easterbrook-motion-to-dismiss-denied-20210203-ckkjkcp4tvdw7a3baqwyhydsxa-
story.html [https://perma.cc/EUL3-KJ6P]. 
 23. Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. CV 2020-0132-KSJM, 2020 WL 6870461 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 24, 2020), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2020); see also William Savitt, Sarah 
K. Eddy & Cynthia Fernandez Lumermann, Section 220 as Pre-Complaint Discovery–
Recent Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/15/section-220-as-pre-complaint-discovery-
recent-developments [https://perma.cc/T78P-9DY8]. 
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“E” for EESG purposes in nominating corporate governance.  
And “E” for environmental legal compliance in audit, if environmental 
risk is central to your product line. You probably have an industry-
specific risk committee that handles all elements of that “E,” integrating 
related compliance, EESG, and risk management efforts efficiently. 
Then you concentrate financial risk in the audit committee. With a more 
rational committee structure, you will be able to use diversity in all its 
meanings there, because you will actually get to situate talent on the 
board that you really need to run your business. You will be able to put 
diverse expertise on the board and you will have reporting relationships 
that make sense. Then you should align your reporting standards and 
have the correct committees use them to monitor progress. 
One of the real challenges for the prior panel, in terms of what they 
were talking about the whole day, is that companies don’t know how to 
efficiently address these demands. Part of what I’m saying is, think like 
businesspeople. Align what you are doing with what you seek to 
accomplish, and make sure you have an allocation of talent and time 
management that really tracks your key business risks, which are going 
to track identically with how you affect society. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Chief Justice, the organizers are tickling me in 
the chat box to wrap it up, but I do want to ask you one more question. 
You alluded at the very beginning to the B Lab—I don’t know if you 
mentioned their white paper, but you alluded to B Lab and our common 
friend Rick Alexander—and they recently put out a white paper24 that 
suggests that a number of the types of reforms that you have been 
talking about ought to be written into federal law. In fact, they write out 
a fairly elaborate statutory rewrite for different places where ESG or 
perhaps EESG could be a recognized in federal law using the 
international interstate commerce clause as a way to get into federal 
law.25 So my last question for you, and it can be as brief or as long as 
you would like, should these things be mandatory or written into federal 
law by the new administration? 
HON. STRINE: I think some of them should be. I actually have  
a comprehensive bill version of my paper on fair and sustainable 
capitalism that talks about requirements for double ESG disclosure 
giving the SEC an updated mandate that would allow them and require 
 
 24. Frederick H. Alexander, Putting Benefit Corporation Statutes Into Context by 
Putting Context Into the Statutes, S’HOLDER COMMONS (July 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3648137 [https://perma.cc/84HV-E99B]. 
 25. Id. 
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them to consult with agencies like the EPA and the Department of Labor 
to develop metrics,26 because I think the SEC rightly feels like it should 
get more of a view from subject matters expertise on those subjects.  
I also propose extending the SEC’s mandate to require EESG disclosure 
from large private companies. They shouldn’t have to disclose 
everything about their independent directors or the things that are just 
relevant to investors, but they should have to disclose EESG 
performance on a level playing field basis. 
We have private large companies that pose real risks to workers, to 
the environment, and to others, and they should not get a free pass on no 
public disclosure. We have already reduced the number of public 
companies and thus our window in the economy. We can’t continue in 
that direction sustainably and so I think that granting the SEC authority 
to require large private companies to disclose EESG metrics is clearly 
an area needing Federal action. I also think there needs to be a lot of 
action on the institutional investor front to have corresponding 
disclosure requirements for institutional investors around EESG that 
would match up with the requirement for operating companies. Then 
make sure that we bring 13-D disclosure into the 21st century by 
covering derivatives, requiring disclosure or cease trading at 5%, and 
10b-5 liability for trading by fellow wolves before the lead wolf goes 
public. 
On the benefit corporation model, Delaware has been a leader and  
I pushed Delaware. My friend Rick was originally an opponent, so he 
has been a bit of a Saul on the road to Damascus.27 Rick is a wonderful 
person, one of the best corporate lawyers in the nation, and I am proud 
to call him a friend; same with Andrew Kassoy and Jay Gilbert. I am not 
averse to a mandate to benefit corporate governance at the federal level, 
as long as it is done through State law. I think it is totally unworkable as 
a federal level corporate form. I do not think Federal courts are ready to 
do fiduciary enforcement. I don’t think it’s their wheelhouse. I don’t 
think there is a need for that cost. I think that there is a range of interest 
in Congress and benefit corporations for people like Senator Warren, 
 
 26. LEO E. STRINE, JR., TOWARD FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE CAPITALISM, ROOSEVELT 
INST. 8–9 (Aug. 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/RI_
TowardFairandSustainableCapitalism_WorkingPaper_202008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YB2H-T3PT]. 
 27. Acts 9:3–6 (King James). 
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who would go the whole hog and would require it, to people more in the 
center, like Senator Warner from Virginia—who I have a lot of respect 
for, like I have respect for Senator Warren—but he has been more 
concerned about the “carrot” than a mandate; he would create some 
incentives for these things. So a lot of my friends in the B Lab and  
I have been largely in sync on this. 
I think what we’re also saying is: if you imagine George Martin 
producing the Beatles—if he’s moving a bunch of knobs, but not any 
one knob in a radical direction, but he’s moving a lot of knobs in a way 
that’s harmonious and produces the outcome you want—that’s what you 
got to look for in corporate governance reform. Part of what I think the 
B Lab people and I are focused on is, what can we do to make all public 
and large private companies align their interests more with sustainable 
wealth creation for their stockholders and fair treatment of stakeholders. 
And in the institutional investor space, how do we make sure their 
interests are similarly aligned, and then what kind of things can we do to 
protect our political process in the same way? For example, I support 
requiring stockholder approval of political spending because I think that 
will make it go away as no stockholders will vote for it. I think, by the 
way, most businesses don’t want to give, but they’re coerced into giving 
and they would like to be able to be say no. The investment policies, for 
example, I heard David telling. I have been a huge proponent, and 
worked for years with Aspen, and other people worked on these ideas. 
We didn’t call it the Green New Deal but we were talking about 
investments to tackle climate change, to create jobs, to invest in basic 
research and things that are a win-win for the productive economy and 
American workers. 
I do think that next year, it could be a really critical year, and  
I would love to see a 21st century New Deal, even more, I’d like to see a 
global 21st century New Deal where on things like climate change, on 
deterring speculation and encouraging long term investment, we actually 
work with our OECD colleagues together to build worker protections 
and environmental protections into the world trading bloc to deal with 
exactly the international pressures you were talking about. So count me 
a big yes for the need for appropriate government regulation. 
What I would say to my friends in the business and institutional 
investor community, is that you recognize that this sort of rebalancing is 
not at all radical, that it’s actually a restoration of the consensus that 
made our economies and made us proud because we defeated fascism 
and communism, and we spread the blessings and prosperity more 
widely. If we restore that, we can close the racial equality gap. We can 
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create more economic security, and we can tackle climate change. 
Business communities are going to be more respected, the institutional 
investment community will prosper and have more clients, and we’ll 
have a better future. If there’s resistance to change on sensible lines, 
what I fear is increased divisiveness, nativism, and ultimately the 
pressure for more extreme solutions that may not look like something 
like the win-win approach of the New Deal that harnessed market forces 
and government regulation in a way that was productive for everyone. 
Absent support from business elites for a constructive agenda of 
that kind, I think we could end up with overreach and Balkanization 
among our economic allies that we will greatly regret. So it is vital how 
business reacts next year and whether they align their political actions 
with the positive attitude they have expressed in the BRT statement, the 
institutional investor community’s recent reaction to the need to address 
inequality along racial and economic lines. If they walk that talk next 
year, then I think we’re going to be in a very good place as a nation. 
If they don’t, then I fear that things will go to a very negative place. 
I am modestly hopeful and it is a real time for positive action to create  
a fairer economy. 
Sorry for keeping everybody away from their martini and beer  
on Friday night. 
PROF. GRIFFITH: Thanks very much. I am going to turn it over  
to John Torabi to wrap us up. 
 
